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WHO'S ON FIRST?:
THE ROLE OF THE OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET IN
FEDERAL INFORMATION POLICY
James Z O'Reilly*
Private sector information is the fuel on which the modem engine
of regulatory government steams ahead. A growing demand for that
fuel has caused extensive reexaminations of the federal government's
ability to handle the information which it collects. The 1980 Paperwork Reduction Act' is a fuel conservation measure, imposing restraints on agency collections of information. But the engine of
regulatory control also needs an emissions control, a federal policy on
disclosure of private information.
Federal policies exist for many less important issues. Our national
government is staffed with policy analysts, studied by students of public
policy, and investigated for its policy failures. The current federal policy on the disclosure of federal information about non-federal persons'
activities is no policy at all. There is no consistent policy to be analyzed, studied, or investigated.
While every democracy favors "openness," and the United States
has historically led the world in open government, few nations would
imitate the dispersed power and casual manner with which American
government officials can decide the important questions of technology
transfer, commercial and personal data dissemination, and records
sharing. The issues involve a conflict between private rights, such as
the right to innovate in a new but nonpatented process, and public
rights to oversee the contents of federal filings. This article does not
examine the larger debate of private versus public rights, but focuses
instead on how formation of a coherent disclosure policy can reduce
the conflicts between these rights. Antonin Scalia, an eminent scholar,
government official, teacher, and recent appointee to the United States
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, recently stated that our disclosure system is flawed and that our principal disclosure statute "has no
clothes," as it gives the impression of freedom but the reality of signifiCopyright © 1983, by J.T. O'Reilly.
Lecturer in Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law; corporate practice, Cincinnati,
Ohio. Initial research for this article was funded under a consultant contract with the Ad-

ministrative Conference of the United States, but this article reflects the personal views of the
1.

author alone and not those of any institution.
Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (1980) (to be codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3500 et seq.).
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cant administrative problems.' It has been said that governmental disclosures are now allowed for "everybody, practically anything,
anytime, except .. .," with the exceptions expanding in confused
proliferation.' If policy formulation can resolve some of the inconsistencies and interpretative problems, and thereby make the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA)4 work more effectively, then such a policy
should be established as soon as possible.
THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET AND
INFORMATION POLICY
A "policy" may be defined as an intentionally consistent analysis or
pattern of issue resolution, for similar questions in a variety of contexts.
For purposes of this discussion, policies are not forced upon an agency
by statute, but are voluntary decisions within an agency's discretionconsistent of course with any clear statutory requirements. The federal
policy on a given subject, if one can be said to exist, is the sum of the
Presidential directives, Cabinet officer directives, regulations, and policy-related adjudications which occur in the executive branch agencies
at any given time. "Information policy," therefore, is the conscious decision of the executive branch to approach issues of information collection and disclosure in a consistent manner.5
The results of extensive interviews of federal and nonfederal officials familiar with information policy suggest that a central information
policy on dissemination of federal collections of private documents
does not exist. 6 Both the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
and the Department of Justice (DOJ) are prospective creators of such a
federal policy. As this article discussed the DOJ has been held to account for its stewardship of an advisory role and has been found lacking as a policymaker and leader. Meanwhile, the OMB has left
untouched a new set of powers which could fill the vacuum left by the
DOJ, if OMB were inclined to take on the burden and potential opposition which information policy-making entails. Until OMB assumes
2.
3.
4.

Scalia, The Freedom of InformationAct Has No Clothes, 6 REGULATION 14 (March 1982).
Note, Public Inspection ofState andMunicipalExecutive Documents: Everybody, Practically
Everything Anytime, Except ....
45 FORD. L. REv. 1105 (1977).
Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp.

11979)).
5.

6.

This article will concentrate upon the disclosure aspects of the Paperwork Reduction Act.
The Act has many other aspects. The terms "information policy" and "information disclosure policy" when used in this article refer exclusively to information received from outside
of the federal government. Practices related to agency dissemination of federally conducted
studies or internal documents are not covered by this article. For a discussion of those issues
see generally 2 J. O'REILLY, FDE.AL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE chs. 15, 17 (1977 & Supp.
1982).
The author conducted numerous interviews in preparing this article, which will be referred
to throughout this article. The 1981 interviews were conducted under the auspices of the
Administrative Conference in research for its Freedom of Information Act study. The 1982
interviews were conducted specifically for this article. Several persons interviewed spoke
from personal experience; the views expressed do not necessarily represent official policies of

their institutions.
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its responsibilities more fully, dispersed and divergent agency disclosure policies continue to exploit this power vacuum, and the public is ill

served by inconsistent and unpredictable federal action concerning
fragile and irretrievable private rights to the preservation of confiden-

tial information.
This article addresses the topic of an information policy as a coordination of choices among several lawful alternatives available to the
OMB. It would be a misuse of the term "information policy" to use it

to mask a suppression of dissent, as with Poland's martial law government's policy limiting information. Censorship and "managed" news
about publicly known events are anathema to our First Amendmentconscious society.' Policy choices have to be made in the much narrower area of how much of the federal agency file information which

may lawfully be withheld, should be withheld." Congress creates the
discretion; federal information policy directs the exercise of the delegated discretion.
The OMB is a policy coordination staff for the executive branch on
a wide variety of issues.' Units of the OMB review executive branch

employees' testimony on legislation to assure consistency. The Office
of Federal Procurement Policy coordinates important government

purchasing issues. 10 Under authority of Executive Order 12,291,11 and

perhaps a futute statutory power as well,

2

the Office of Information

and Regulatory Affairs in the OMB coordinates studies of the expense
7.

8.

9.

10.

Censorship concerning publicly known events or the activities of government in the military,
diplomatic or other spheres is unfortunately a condition endemic in many countries of the
world. The theme of this article is limited to the United States experience with a set of
privately created information which is shared with federal agencies without expectation that
the information is already or will be made public, e.g., a new product design or a tax return
or a union's bargaining plan for 1984 negotiations.
Senator James Abourezk (D-S.D.), who headed the Subcommittee with Freedom of Information Act oversight responsibility, said it best extemporaneously in a hearing: "Government-wide leadership does not exist. It can only come directly from the President or a
designee of his. You know as well as I do that the Justice Department only advises and that
they don't direct government-wide implementation of the Freedom of Information Act. In
reality Government-wide direction does not exist and, I think it probably should." Freedom
of lnformationAct: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Administrative PracticeandProcedure
Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 149 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977
FO Hearings].
The Office of Management & Budget was created by Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1970 from
the former Bureau of the Budget. The House Committee on Government Operations voted
to kill the Reorguization but the President was sustained in the full House, 193-164. Mansfield, Reorganizingthe Executive BrancA"The Limits of Institutionalization,in THE INSTITUTIONALIZED PRESIDENCY 66 (N. Thomas and H. Baade eds. 1972). For a history of OMB,
see also L. LYNN, MANAGING THE PUBLIC'S BUSINESS (1981); L. BERMAN, THE OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT & BUDGET AND THE PRESIDENCY, 1921-1979 (1979); F. MALEK, WASHINGTON'S HIDDEN TRAGEDY: THE FAILURE TO GET GOVERNMENT TO WORK (1978); R. ROSE,
MANAGING PRESIDENTIAL OBJECTIVES (1976).
The Office of Federal Procurement Policy is a statutory agency placed within OMB. 40

U.S.C. § 471.
11.
12.

Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981).
S. 1080 and H.R. 746, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981), would have made the OMB role a statutory oversight role in regulatory analysis on new agency regulations. See Bliss, Regulatory
Refor Toward More Balancedand Flexible FederalAgency Regulation, 8 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 619 (1981).
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13
of public compliance with new regulations.
Central policy coordination of administrative regulations has been
the principal task for the OMB and for its predecessor, the Bureau of
the Budget, since the 1930's when the Bureau began to evolve away
from strictly responding to budget requests of agencies and Congress
toward a greater involvement with policy and its implementation.' 4
This role was enhanced by the Brownlow Commission study in the
1930's and by later government management studies. 5 Officials at several levels of OMB stressed that their work was already so extensive
and complex that the biggest current disincentive to central policy
functioning is the sheer weight of projects already designated for OMB
attention. While many OMB officials expressed strong feelings about
the OMB role in information policy management, each coupled that
desire with a recognition of OMB's staggering workload. 6
A wider set of information policy roles resides in the OMB than in
any other single agency. Its first statutory role in this field was the
power to write the policy governing the purchases of information
processing systems by federal agencies. The Brooks Act of 196517
curbed the "computer revolution" in federal recordkeeping by making
the OMB partially responsible for standards on the selection and use of
information processing equipment by the federal government. 8 It may
appear easy to separate the information itself from the hardware used
for its collection, but the Brooks Act is one of the OMB's first and most
important linkages to the supervision of information collection through
the wide variety of federal programs.

THE PRIVACY ACT AND THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT

The OMB was given responsibility for developing guidelines to implement the Privacy Act of 1974 when that statute was adopted late in

the 1974 session.' 9 That statute was an effort to construct a federal
protection for personal information contained within federal files.
Through many controversial compromises, and against the historic set13.

The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, a part of the Office of Management &
Budget, is responsible for the review of regulations proposed by agencies, which undergo
regulatory analysis, as well as for the Paperwork Reduction Act and other functions. Tele-

phone interviews with Nat Scurry, Chief, Reports Management Branch, OMB (Aug. 1982).
14. L. BERMAN, supra note 9.
15. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT (1937).
16. Though the Paperwork Reduction Act issues are "enormously complex," the OMB finds the
Act a "significant improvement in the centralization of information policy functions within
the federal government." Interviews with M. Horowitz, Counsel to the Director, and N.
Scurry, Chief, Reports Management Branch, OMB (July-Aug. 1982). But all the OMB officials noted the large existing workload of the agency.
17. Brooks Act, Pub. L. No. 89-306, 79 Stat. 1127 (1965) (codified at 40 U.S.C. § 759 (1976)).
The Act delegated "fiscal and policy control exercise" to what is now OMB.
18. 40 U.S.C. § 759(g) (1976). The policy is set from time to time by OMB, see OMB Circular
A-121 (Sept. 16, 1980), re Cost Accounting, Cost Recovery and Interagency Sharing of Data
Processing Facilities, 41 C.F.R. pt. 101-35, 47 Fed. Reg. 33,960 (1982).
19. Pub. L. No. 93-579 § 6, 88 Stat. 1909 (1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976 & Supp. I
1978)).
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ting of the Watergate impeachment hearings, the Privacy Act became
less comprehensive and more narrow than its advocates originally had
expected.2 °
The OMB assignment under the Privacy Act is "to develop guidelines and regulations for agencies to use in implementing the provisions
of the Act and to provide continuing assistance to and oversight of the
implementation of the provisions of this Act by the agencies. 21 OMB
was considered the proper coordination agency because of its experience in issuing policy circulars and in management oversight.22 In
1974, this experience could not be matched by any other agency or by
any agency specially created to implement the Act.
The OMB role came as a last-minute compromise addition to the
Privacy Act bills, in which the Senate originally had proposed the creation of a permanent Privacy Protection Commission. 23 The conference
committee members deleted the proposal for a permanent Commission,
and instead created a temporary study group to undertake a research
study into privacy protection in the public and private sectors.24 The
study commission's recommendations were scholarly and comprehensive.25 In retrospect, however, the delegation of many of the controversial issues to the study commission merely shelved them for the
foreseeable future. 26 Though a few study commission recommendations have been adopted, for the most part the congressional constituency for passage of a stronger privacy control act had faded by the time
the study was completed.27 Like many other federal studies, the study
commission's privacy papers have remained on the congressional shelf.
Congress delegated to OMB the authority over the records and administrative details of the thousands of federal advisory committees,
20.

The Privacy Act applies only if information concerns an "individual" and is present in a
"record" which is within a "system of records" which then is not either an exempt system of
records or possessed by an agency exempt from the access provisions of the Act. See generaly 2 J. O'REILLY, supra note 5, chs. 20-22.
21. Pub. L. No. 93-579 § 6(1), 88 Stat. 1909 (1974).
22. See, e.g., the current Brooks Act circular, OMB Circular A-121, supra note 18. OMB has
produced a circular for Paperwork Reduction Act policies, after successful negotiations with
opponents in the Justice Department regarding the PRA. Feaver, OMB to keep Firingin War
on Paperwork,Washington Post, Sept. 3, 1982, and Paperwork Reduction Act procedures, 47
Fed. Reg. 39,515 (1982) (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. § 1320.11).
23. The Senate bill, S. 3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), had not delegated authority to OMB, but
to an independent commission. The House bill provided no central agency. The compromise that emerged placed the OMB in charge. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS AND STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON OPERATIONS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESs., LEGISLATIVE

24.

HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 S. 3418, SOURCEBOOK ON PRIVACY 993 (Joint
Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as PRIVACY ACT LEGIS. HIST.].
Pub. L. No. 93-579 § 5, 88 Stat. 1909 (1974).

25.

PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY (1977).

26.

Because the Privacy Act was an end of session bill, no Conference was possible between the
Senate and House. Those issues which were too difficult to resolve without a contested Conference vote were passed along to the Commission. Pub. L. No. 93-579 § 5(c), 88 Stat. 1909

(1974).
27. Little or none of the PPSC study's recommendations, apart from those related to credit legislation, have become law.
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when it passed the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) in 1972.28
The FACA is a public access statute, similar to the Freedom of Information Act, 29 but applicable to quasi-federal advisors who assist federal agencies but whose deliberative meetings and recommendations
previously had been secret." After the OMB set up the FACA controls
31
and assisted agencies to reduce the number of advisory committees,
the role of day-to-day supervision of the committees was passed back to
the General Services Administration.3 2
Despite the OMB's involvement with the four corners of information policy--guidelines on agency disclosures under the Privacy Act,
funding of affirmative publications, oversight of collection of data, and
the shepherding of equipment and advisors-OMB has not yet undertaken to establish a central information policy for the federal government. This omission can be studied in several dimensions, with the
same conclusion: diversity of information policies at the agency level
creates problems which have been recognized for several years. A discussion of information policy, the predominance of the Freedom of Information Act and its omission-based diversities, must precede any
effort to solve the tangled state of federal information policy.
EVOLUTION OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)3 3 was a very timely response to well-documented abuses by federal agencies. The 1958-63
legislative record, assembled by the newspaper trade associations with
sponsorship by Rep. John Moss (D-Cal.) and Sen. Edward Long (DMo.), suggests a fragmented picture of many inconsistent, uncooperative agencies withholding information at random and often without explanation.34 The agencies could withhold information under the
provisions of section 3 of the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).35 Section 3 limited public access to government records under
28.
29.
30.

31.
32.
33.
34.

35.

Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. 1 (1976)).
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. 1 1978).
Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972). See S. REFr. No. 1098, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
Criticism of FACA was aired at Hearings on S. 2947, To Amend the Advisory Committee Act
Before Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 144 (1976). See Tuerkheimer, Veto By Neglect: The FederalAdvisoryCommitteeAct, 25 AM. U.L. REv. 53 (1975).
The Carter Administration made an extra effort to reduce the numbers of advisory committees. The improvement of advisory committees has been the subject of extensive study, see
Conference on FederalAdvisoryCommittees, KETTERING FOUND. PROC. (1981).
GSA received the Advisory Committee role in 1978. See 41 C.F.R. § 101-11.1201 (1981).
Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (currently codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1976)).
The patterns of withholding were internally inconsistent within the Defense Department and
were variable within a wide range for agencies generally. Sigma Delta Chi report in Freedom
of Information and Secrecy in Government: HearingsBefore the Subcomna on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 548 (1958); see also
Blanchard, A History of the Federal Records Law, U. Mo. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
CENTER REPORT No. 189 (1967); Freedom ofinformatioir HearingsBefore Senate Comm on
the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) [hereinafter cited as 1963 FOI Hearings], and
illustrative examples in 1 J. O'REILLY, supra note 5, § 2.02.
5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1964).
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a broad need-to-know standard which allowed great discretion to the
government.3 6
Management of the APA was decentralized,37 since the Act was a

process-oriented statute to be functionally implemented by each of the
many different federal agencies. 38 The DOJ had a dominant non-statutory advisory role, however. The Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Procedure had produced a definitive study which even-

tually became the 1946 Act. 39 The DOJ had been intimately involved
in all the negotiations on that omnibus procedure statute.40 When'the

APA was adopted, the DOJ issued a manual which was the primary
contemporaneous interpretation of the APA. 4 ' The DOJ's view of dis-

closures required under section 3 was quite narrow.42 As the terms of
section 3 were being revised to become the FOIA, the DOJ again was
deeply involved as protector of the agencies. 43 An historical antecedent
existed for the DOJ's non-statutory, agency-protective interpretative
role with the emerging APA section 3 amendment which became the
FOIA. 44
Because the statute from which the FOIA evolved had been an omnibus statute which all federal agencies applied to their own functions,
the omission of a central administrative focus in the 1966 FOIA was
understandable. Each agency approached the APA rulemaking requirements in a unique way, as they affected the agency's greater or
lesser need for rules. 45 Congress had considered a central Office of Administrative Procedure but dropped the concept for lack of a political
constituency. 46 Similarly, Senator Nelson had considered a central in36.
37.
38.

39.
40.
41.

To be released under § 3 of the APA, matters had to be of official record and the persons
requesting access had to show that they were properly and directly concerned. Then the
agency could refuse disclosure if the records were "confidential for good cause found."
Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 238 (1946).
No central agency has authority over the implementation of the APA. For background on
the judicial consequences, see 1 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE (2d ed. 1978).
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES (1941).
See ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) [hereinafter cited as APA LEGIS. HIST.].
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

ACT (1947).
"The great mass of material relating to the internal operation of an agency is not a matter of
official record ....
It is clear that section 3(c) is not intended to open up Government files
for general inspection." Id at 25.
43. The Justice Department was the principal voice for the agencies in opposition to the FOIA,
see 1963 FOIHearings,supra note 34.
44. Section 3 became the Freedom of Information Act on July 4, 1967. Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80
Stat. 383 (1966); Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (1967).
45. For example, the National Labor Relations Board did not adopt rules, while other agencies
relied principally on rulemaking and did little adjudication. See I K. DAVIS, supra note 38.
Agencies have discretion concerning their adjudication or rulemaking choices, see, e.g., SEC
v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
The disposition of a dispute concerning public access to private information is an informal
adjudication, specific to a particular case, but is required to be subject to agency rules, 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (1976).
42.

46.

ATT'Y GEN. COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROC., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERN-

MENT AGENCIES ch. VIII (1941). See APA LEGIS. HIST., supra note 40.
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formation "ombudsman" in 1963. 41 But the new law was not expected
to become administratively burdensome, so Congress and commentators expected each agency would approach the new FOIA as each had
approached the APA. The courts were left to screen the abuses.4"
Management of the Information Disclosure Laws
The results of omitting a central functioning supervisory agency in
the hew FOIA were predictable. The DOJ issued a new manual on the
revised section 3 of the APA4 9 which was again criticized for over-protecting the agencies.5 0 Agencies wrote their own FOIA implementing

regulations. 5 Congress was critical of the ways in which some agencies

avoided the new legislative command by rules which "contain[ed] lan-

guage showing that arrogant public-information policies still endure in

agencies." 52
Though in presentation the FOIA looked like an offspring of the

APA, it quickly developed a life and identity of its own. Litigation
under the new FOIA put the DOJ to the test. In the Consumers Union
v. Veterans Administration53 hearing aids case in 1969, the DOJ sought
the same deference from the court for its interpretation of the FOIA
exemptions as other courts had given to other interpretations by responsible agencies which construed new laws. In a well-written opinion, the district court rejected the DOJ interpretation. Because the

FOIA intentionally had not given a leadership role to one agency, the
54
court held, no agency would be able to claim interpretive authority.
Rejection by the court of DOJ's central role was not taken lightly by

the Department. The Department quickly moved to set up an internal
advisory process which added some credibility to the agency's claim to
interpretative deference.55 The DOJ response to Consumers Union was
1963 FOI Hearings supra note 34 (remarks of Sen. Nelson).
The Act was to be enforced by litigation against each individual agency in each individual
situation of withholding. There was no appeal mechanism in the statute outside of the
agency which held the documents itself. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)-(4) (1976).
49. Attorney General's Memorandum on the Public Information Section of the Administrative
Procedure Act (1967).
50. Freedom of Information" HearingsBefore Senate Comn on Judiciaryand Senate Comn on
Gov't Operations, 93d Cong., IstSess., voL 2 at 122 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 F01
Hearings]. The Manual was called a "roadmap to nowhere" by the St. Louis Globe. Kruger, The Access to FederalRecordsLaw, U. Mo. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION CENTER REP.
47.
48.

No. 186 (1967).

51.

The first implementing regulations for each agency are reprinted in HOUSE COMM. ON GOVT.
OPERATIONS, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AcT (COMPILATION AND ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENTAL REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING 5 U.S.C. § 552), 90rM CONG., 2D SESs.(Comm. Print

1968) [hereinafter cited as 1968 FOIA ANALYSIS].
52. Id The Committee's analysis contains acid disdain for several agency rules which creatively
tried to evade the new law.
53. 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissedas moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971).
54. 301 F. Supp. at 801.
55. The Freedom of Information Committee of the Department received additional attention
from the Department as a result of the 1973 challenges, and an informal advisory role began
to evolve within the Office of Legal Counsel, led by Robert Saloschin. The 1977 hearings
and the new Administration's greater willingness to disclose were catalysts for creation of the
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the 1969 establishment of the Freedom of Information Committee.
The Committee was created by an internal DOJ memorandum.5 6 The
function of the Committee would be to reduce litigation losses by selecting out those cases which should be administratively "settled" by
disclosure, prior to any litigation. 7
It is notable that the advisory role of the DOJ was not "pushed" by
statute, as, for example, the OMB was thrust into advising about the
later Privacy Act.58 The DOJ's role was "self-pulled" by dissatisfaction
with the court's rejection of the Department's claims to deference for its
administrative judgments. The court examined the FOIA and found
nothing to indicate a DOJ supervisory role warranting a deferential
respect;59 the recognition of the omission of its powers from the FOIA
led the DOJ to take action. It was natural for the Department, as for
any bureaucratic organization, to make the effort to supply de facto
legitimacy to a role denied it de jure by the Congress and courts. De
facto legitimacy for the DOJ's advisory role would come from day to
day advising, and that supervisory role was thereafter assumed by the
DOJ for those agencies which had to, or wished to, seek the Department's advice.6°
Managing the FOIA proved to be much more expensive than originally estimated, but even after fifteen years there is no central source
for an accurate expense estimate. 61 The primary costs were those of
administrative processing of the disclosure process-far greater than
the government's costs of manpower for litigation.62
Agency leadership in addressing FOIA issues was, on the whole,
sadly lacking.63 The best managed agencies tended to do a better job of
Office of Information Law & Policy in 1978. For a brief history of that work, see Braeman,
56.

Overview of FOIA Administration in Government, 34 AD. L. REv. 111 (1982).
Memorandum of Dec. 8, 1969, reprintedin US Government InformationPoliciesandPractices:
Hearingsbefore House Comm. on Govt. Operations,92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4 at 1130 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Info. PracticesHearings]. See also ADMINISTRATION OF THE FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION AcT, H.R. REP. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1972) [hereinafter cited

as ADMINISTRATION OF FOIA]. It is of anecdotal historical significance that the coauthor of
the memorandum and the Justice Department's highest ranking policy official involved with
the startup of the Freedom of Information Act in 1969-71 was later the author of several
major FOIA decisions of the Supreme Court, Justice William Rehnquist.
57. Id Justice's "policy" was not to risk losing. A matter of interest to an agency program would
not be defended if other programs would be placed at some jeopardy from a loss of a de58.

fended case involving the particular agency in the dispute.
See Pub. L. No. 93-579 § 6(1), 88 Stat. 1909 (1974).

59. 301 F. Supp. at 801.
60.

61.

62.
63.

The only legislative recommendation of the role of the Committee was in oversight hearing
report, which found a "salutary" effect but also noted administrative weaknesses. The House
Committee did respond by giving the Justice group statutory status, however. ADMINISTRATION OF FOIA, supra note 56, at 69.
The Justice Department estimated a cost of $47-57 million. Freedom of Information Oversight: Hearingsbefore House Comm on Govt. Operations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 202 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as 1981 FOIHearings]. The OMB estimated the cost at $250 million. Remarks of M. Horowitz, Counsel to the Director, OMB, to Administrative Conference, December 1981.
No central source of Justice's litigation of particular types of cases is available which would
include all the direct costs of local and headquarters involvement with the FOIA case load.
ADMINISTRATION OF FOIA, supra note 56, at 17.
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processing disclosure requests, but their substantive decisions to withhold a great deal of information brought complaints in the 1973 congressional hearings on FOIA reform.6 In the absence of a central
agency to mediate complaints, Congress found itself in the center of
some early debates over the proper implementation of the FOIA.65
Congressional oversight continued as the disagreements continued.6 6
The OMB stepped into this vacuum on FOIA policy in a very small
way in 1972. Agencies were charging a wide variety of fees to members
of the public who requested documents under the FOIA. OMB Director George Schultz, with authority under the user charges powers of
OMB,6 7 ordered agencies to stop charging fees "at an excessive level for
the purpose of deterring requests for copies of records". 6 But OMB
position and in later Senate testimony was criticized
retreated from that
69
for its timidity.
Criticism of the DOJ was expressed in 1973 Senate hearings. Ralph
Nader charged that the Department had "done almost nothing to insure voluntary compliance with the act."7 0 The Freedom of Information Committee, charged Nader, did not advise agencies of recent
developments in case law, and the DOJ had not updated its 1967 Memorandum. "The government has not been winning any greater a percentage of cases since the inception of this committee."7 To add to the
critical view, Nader asserted that agencies "have been left to themselves
without any government-wide guidance, and they have failed to comply with the letter and intent of the Act."'7 2 Senate criticism was not
taken lightly by the Department, but events in the press coverage of
Watergate, the courts' interpretations of the FOIA, and the Congres73
sional desire to revise the FOIA overshadowed these criticisms.
The 1974 FOLA Amendments and the Justice Department
Enactment of the 1974 amendments to the FOIA was a tremendous
achievement for the advocacy and public interest groups which had
strongly supported their passage. 74 These groups, which had been less
64.
65.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

1973 FOI Hearings,supra note 50, vols. 1-2.
"During the first year of operation, as numerous questions of application and interpretation
arose, the... Subcommittee was thrust into the unofficial role of an 'ombudsman' - or
referee." 1968 FOIA ANALYSIS, supra note 51, at 7.
ADMINISTRATION OF FOIA, supra note 56, at 17. See 1973 F0I Hearings, supra note 50,
vols. 1-2.
44 U.S.C.A. § 35 (West Supp. 1982).
Schultz to heads of executive departments, May 2, 1972, reprintedin 1973 FOI Hearings,
supra note 50, vol. 1, at 204.
Id at 216.
Id See Info. Practices Hearings,supra note 56, pt. 4, at 1250 et seq.
1973 FOI Hearings, supra note 50, at 217.
Id at 216.
The Department was amply criticized by more people for more failings, making the FOI
Committee a minor issue by contrast. 1973 F0I Hearings,supra note 50; Info. Practices
Hearings,supra note 56.

74. The advocates fought off a vigorous last-minute counterattack by the FBI and Sen. Hruska,

and overcame a veto by President Ford. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM.ON THE JUDICIARY
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of a political force during the Act's original debates in 1960-65, 75 readfly took over the lobbying effort which press groups had carried for the
original Act. The press sought the Act's passage, 77and supported the
78
final bil 7 6 with its various changes to time limits, awards of fees,
tightening of military79 and law enforcement"0 exemptions, and other
FOIA provisions. A barrage of editorials lamenting Watergate and
viewing the legislative change as an antidote to the Watergate malaise
helped Congress to override President Ford's veto of the 1974
amendments."'
The primary loser in the 1974 amendments was the DOJ. The
Watergate period had not been the finest hour for either the Department or its law enforcement arm, the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Of those issues on which the DOJ opposed the legislation, virtually all
fell against the Department's position.8 2 As noted earlier, the hearing
testimony had been critical of both a lack of leadership and of the Department specifically. 3 It is not surprising that the 1974 revisions to
the FOIA did not grant authority to the DOJ for management of government-wide information policy matters. Instead, Congress compelled each agency to write an annual statistical report on its FOIA
activities, and compelled the DOJ to include in its report "efforts undertaken. . . to encourage agency compliance."8 4 The command was
a response to Ralph Nader's strong criticism of the Department's lack
of leadership. 5 In the remainder of the Act, the DOJ, as litigator, suffered from shorter action deadlines, more narrow exemptions, and attorney fee awards which would more readily be given to the requesters
who opposed withholding in court.8 6
One interesting result of the tacit decision not to create an informaAND HOUSE COMM. ON GOVT. OPERATIONS, 94TH CONG., IST SESs, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AcT AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974 SOURCEBOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

OTHER DOCUMENTS (Joint Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as FOIA SOURCEBOOK].
Compare the original 1963-65 hearings, supra note 34, with the 1973 hearings, supra notes 50
and 56. The burden of carrying the amendments was on the public interest groups and other
advocacy groups with the press assisting those groups.
Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974).
Id § 1(c).
Id § 1(b) revising 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(F).
Id § 2(a), revising 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1).
Id § 2(b), revising 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7).
AMER. Soc. OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS BULL. (Nov./Dec. 1974, Jan. 1975). ASNE's president
lauded "this historic juncture when the post-Watergate atmosphere of openness promised

more than usual support in Congress."
82. 1973 F01 Hearings,supra note 50, vol. 2, at 229 (testimony of Att'y Gen. Richardson).
83. Id at 216.
84. 5 U.S.C. § 552(d) (1976). The provision was added by Senate Subcommittee General Counsel Thomas Susman. The Justice Department's view of the section is found in Braeman,
supra note 55, at 114.
85. 1973 F01 Hearings,supra note 50, vol. 2, at 216.
86. Justice had been lobbying for two "clients" within its Department, the U.S. Attorneys who
had to handle the defense caseload and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which preferred

the favorable ambiguities of the pre-amendment exemption for law enforcement files.
Neither prevailed, and as a consequence the litigation increased in both quantitative and
qualitative difficulties after the 1974 amendments.

Journalof Legislation

[Vol. 10:95

tion policy coordination agency after the adoption of the 1974 amendments, has been the inability of Congress to assess the impacts of those
amendments. That inability has shown up frequently since 1974. The
estimates of costs of the FOIA have varied within a large range, $50
million to $250 million.87 Numbers of denials of access must be reported to Congress, but agencies vary in the quality of their statistics
and the speed with which they have submitted the required reports.8 8
Decentralization has also produced inconsistent approaches to similar
issues among different agencies as well,8 9 which may have contributed
to more litigation-although, in the absence of a central administrative
authority, it would be impossible to state general reasons for increased
litigation among each of the hundred or more different agencies and
units processing requests under the Act.9"
Litigation of access disputes under the FOIA increased dramatically after the 1974 amendments. At first, the DOJ's litigation had
been supervised by a special group of attorneys who gave a continuity
of interpretations to federal litigation in the FOIA and Privacy Act
fields, at least for those cases on which DOJ counsel were involved. 9'
Other agencies, such as National Labor Relations Board and the Securities and Exchange Commission, were free to use their own counsel and
did so.92 As the government's litigation coordinator, the DOJ actively
supervised agency litigation to the extent possible within very small
budget limits. Later, both the special litigation unit and a special advisory office on FOIA
matters were reorganized into larger entities with
93
broader functions.
During the hearings which preceded the 1974 FOIA amendments,
the DOJ had promised that it would take four steps to improve admin87.

88.
89.

90.
91.
92.

93.

Cost estimates are inclusive of diferent factors for each estimator. The Justice Department's
estimates were between $47.8 million for fiscal 1978 and $57 million for fiscal 1980. The
OMB estimate was $250 million. 1981 FlOIearings,supra note 61. And the Justice Department estimates are known to be low. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, I FOIA UPDATE 2 (Spring 1980).
Reports must be filed with Congressional committees, 5 U.S.C. § 552(d), but the Committees
then had analyses prepared by the Library of Congress. See 1981 FOIHearings,supra note
61.
For example, FDA has routinely released food plant inspection reports, 21 C.F.R. pt. 20,
while USDA ceased such disclosures because of complaints about press accounts of the deficiency reports. USDA Ends Release of Compliance Review Data on IndividualPlants, FOOD
CHEM. NEWS 25 (July 5, 1982).
There is no single count of the number of entities which have authority to make releases
under the FOIA, but the number is over 200.
1977 FOI Hearings,supra note 8, at 147-49.
The Justice Department did not interfere with the independent litigating authority of the
NLRB or the SEC when those agencies were involved with large numbers of FOIA cases.
For example, about 200 cases were concurrently pending against the NLRB prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214 (1977). The
NLRB handled most of that litigation through its own counsel and supervised its policy
approaches internally without direction of the Justice Department. An all time FOIA litigation record was set by the NLRB with 94 new lawsuits in one month against the Board. J.
O'REILLY, UNIONS' RIoHTS TO COMPANY INFORMATION 182 (1980).
The litigation group was terminated and the FOIA caseload distributed among generalists in
the Civil Division of Justice. The advisory role was disestablished and reestablished in 1982.
The changes were reported in 7 AccEss REPORTS 1 (Apr. 29, 1981) and the office was reestablished under new management in 1982. 47 Fed. Reg. 10,809 (1982).
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istration of the FOIA. First, Civil Service Commission training in
FOIA administration would be encouraged.9 4 The training has been
generally successful, and it continues to be assisted by many agencies.95
Second, the DOJ promised to host, and did conduct, a 1973 symposium
on the Act.96 Several speakers from agencies represented at that symposium suggested better ways to organize the executive branch for compliance with the FOIA. 97 Some suggested an inter-a§ency task force on
the FOIA to set a coordinated disclosure policy.9 Third, the DOJ
promised to create an internal task force on better organization of the
information policy functions of the executive branch.9 9 That task force
started work, but ran out of steam in mid-1975 with its project director
commenting: "I have a feeling a great amount of time is now being
spent wastefully because each agency is grappling with the law on its
own terms."'00 Fourth, the Department promised a reminder to agencies that the Freedom of Information Committee, composed of DOJ
lawyers, was to be consulted before agencies made final denials of disclosure. 101 Initial denials of access were made under one or more of the
Act's exemptions.1 02 On the administrative appeal, an agency which
planned to invoke an exemption was supposed to inform the DOJ. The
Committee had no legal authority to change the minds of the agency
managers to whom the appeals were made. The officials were expected
to informally consult the Committee before the requester's access appeal was denied,10 3 but few if any of the consultations led to differences
of major impact. 1 4 Had the issues been close, the DOJ probably
would have refused to defend an agency decision and the agency head
would have appealed to the Attorney General, or used agency counsel
where permitted to do so by statute.10 5
Political and Structural Changes
Part of the reforming mantle of the Carter Administration when it
took office in 1977 was openness. The Administration's approach was
personified by William Bagley, Chairman of the Commodity Futures
94. 1973 FCIHearings,supra note 50, vol. 1, at 510.
95. Training is now provided by the Office of Personnel Management, successor to the Civil

Service Commission.
96. Transcript of Inter-Agency Symposium on Improved Administration of the Freedom of Information Act, Dept. of Justice, Nov. 29, 1973.

97. Id
98. Id (statement by D. Drachsler).
99. 1973 F0I Hearings,supra note 50, vol. 1, at 510.
100. Cohen, Justice Report: New information law gets heavy usefrom public,businesses, NAT'L J.
July 5, 1975, at 985.
101. 1973 F01 Hearings,supra note 50, vol. 1 at 510.

102. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
103. 28 C.F.R. § 50.9, Dept. of Justice Order 530-73 (July 11, 1973).
104. The consultations ranged from about 220 to about 440. 1977 FO Hearings,supra note 8, at

942.
105. Id The agencies are generally limited in their ability to use their own counsel when Justice
refuses. PRESIDENT'S REORGANIZATION PROJECT, STUDY OF FEDERAL LEGAL REPRESENTA-

TION (1978). See Braeman, supra note 55, at 114.
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Trading Commission and a California politician not unaware of the
publicity benefits of open government, who threw the agency's "secret"
rubber stamp markers into the Potomac River for the benefit of photographers." ° But in a more tangible sense, the Carter Administration
produced the first political directive on FOIA responsibility of the
agencies. In a May 5, 1977 letter, Griffin Bell, the new Attorney General, ordered agencies to make public all information requested under
the FOIA unless it would be "demonstrably harmful" to disclose the
documents.17 This expanded the category to be disclosed from the
non-exempt documents to those which were exempt but whose release
could not be "demonstrated" to be harmful. Even if there was a legal
basis to withhold, Bell's order indicated, the agency should not use its
legal authority "unless it is important to the public interest to do so." 108
In October 1978, the DOJ created a structure to put its earlier
promises into effect. The Office of Information Law & Policy was assigned the duty to advise agencies about the FOIA, to act as executive
secretary for the Freedom of Information Committee, and to instruct
agency personnel about FOIA compliance. 10 9 The Office's Director,
Robert Saloschin, was the acknowledged national expert on the FOIA.
Under its new director, the Office expanded the DOJ's de facto control
with an important policy statement in early 1979. The statement formally announced the earlier edict that government attorneys would not
defend an agency which had failed to obtain DOJ clearance of its final
denial." 0 Subsequent policy statements described the Department's intent to permit fewer intra-agency memoranda to be withheld through a
set of standards on withholding of such memoranda."' And the Office
published policy newsletters instructing agencies on a variety of controversial topics, including attorneys fee awards for requesters, law enforcement records, and the policy responses of the DOJ to major
Supreme Court decisions. 1 2 Despite a small staff" 3 and small budget,
the Office of Information Law & Policy filled the vacuum of advisory
106. William Bagley, Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, used this photogenic device to attract publicity for the openness of the CFTC. It unfortunatley was swept
up shortly thereafter in a major struggle involving the CFTC's need to withhold information.
Board of Trade of Chicago v. CFTC, 627 F.2d 392 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
107. Letter of Atty. Gen. Bell to Heads of all departments and agencies, May 5, 1977, reprintedin
1981 FOIHearings,supra note 61, at 912 (the reprinted version contains an incorrect date
through transcription error).
108. Id
109. 43 Fed. Reg. 45,991 (1978) (announcement of OILP establishment).
1I0,.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INFORMATION LAW & POLICY, PROCEDURES & STANDARDS
ON REFUSAL TO DEFEND FOIA SUITS (1979).
111. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INFORMATION LAW & POLICY, POLICY GUIDE: WHEN TO
ASSERT THE DELIBERATIVE PRIVILEGE UNDER EXEMPTION (b)(5) (May 1979),portionsreproducedat 2 J. O'REILLY, supra note 5, § 15.07A (1982 Supp.).
112. OFFICE OF INFORMATION LAW & POLICY, FOIA UPDATE, quarterly publication 1979-82.
113. The office was never larger than 6 or 7 professional staff members, and was more commonly
3 attorneys. Telephone interview with Robert Saloschin, former OILP Director (July 1982).
The former staff departed with the disestablishment of the OILP in 1981. To the "clients,"
the agencies, most of those interviewed for this article appreciated the former staifs accessibility for advice. Treasury Department FOIA expert, Michelle Davis, noted that the primary
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guidance.14 It was abolished in 1981 and reconstituted with new duties
in 1982.
Contrast with the Privacy Act
The 1974 Privacy Act" 5 had passed in the same time period as the
FOIA, in many of the same committees, and through the efforts of the

same legislative supporters) 6 But unlike the 1974 FOIA amendments,
the Privacy Act established the OMB as a central guidance agency with

binding administrative power. 1 7 Agencies reported to OMB rather
than directly to Congress, as was the case under the FOIA." 8 0MB
guidelines controlled the agency regulations and policies, 1' 9 and OMB
1 20

staff members advised agencies on their Privacy Act responsibilities.
The Privacy Act started life with a prediction of large costs, but the
estimates proved too large.' 2 1 The 1974 amendments to the FOIA car-

ried very low estimates of cost, which appear vastly understated. 122
Whether from different coverages, different guidance, or other reasons,
it was significant that Privacy Act administration was much less expensive than either the costs of the FOIA or predicted Privacy Act costs.
The rate of Privacy Act litigation has also been far below that experienced with the FOIA. 123 Reasons for these variations do not all
trace back to central systemic guidance, but an enlightened approach
by a central organization appears to have been a material help in setting up a smoother administration of the Privacy Act. There were still
problems with the OMB interpretations, 24 of course, but conflict

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

121.
122.
123.
124.

benefit of a central resource would be stability in advice and ready access to advisors, regardless of the form taken by the central body.
Office of Information & Privacy, established 47 Fed. Reg. 10,809 (1982) (to be codified at 28
C.F.R. § 0.23a).
Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) (currently codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a
(1976 & Supp. 1 1978)).
The Government Operations Committees of both House and Senate were involved in both
bills. Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) and Representatives Frank Horton (R-N.Y.) and
Bella Abzug (D-N.Y.) were active with both bills in the session preceding adoption.
Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 93-579 § 6, 88 Stat. 1909 (1974). This OMB authority was separate
from the study established for the Privacy Protection Study Commission, id at § 5.
Compareid. § 6, with Freedom of Information Act § 552(d), 5 U.S.C. § 552(d) (1976).
The Privacy Act Guidelines of the OMB (July 1, 1975) are reprinted in full in PRIVACY ACT
LEGis. HIsT., supra note 23, at 1015.
Interviews with OMB staff during 1982 suggest that the volume of Privacy Act consultations
have lessened with time. Mr. Rob Veeder of OMB, one of the agency Privacy Act experts,
observed that there are still ambiguities in the Privacy Act but that OMB had no immediate
plans to revise its 1975 Guidelines. See also PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION,
THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974: AN ASSESSMENT 17 (1977).
PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 120, at 39.
1981 FOIHearings,supra note 61, at 168.
See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION CASE LIST 96 (Sept. 1981 ed.).
OMB's interpretation of an individual's record had excluded the entrepreneurial activities of
individuals. This interpretation was challenged, and OMB repeatedly lost with courts
squarely facing and rejecting the exclusion. 2 J. O'REILLY, supra note 5, § 20.05; Metadure
Corp. v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 1368, 1373-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Florida Medical Ass'n v.
Dept. of HEW, 479 F. Supp. 1291 (M.D. Fla. 1979); Zeller v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 487
(E.D.N.Y. 1978); See also remarks of Sen. Ervin in debate covering "small businessmen,"
120 CONG. REc. 36,896 (1974).
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avoidance was easier to achieve with the Privacy Act than with the

FOIA.
THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT: NEW ROLE IN
INFORMATION POLICY
The "Paperwork Issue" and Information Management Issues
The FOIA and the Privacy Act are important to managing the outflow of the government's paperwork. But the overall issue of controlling inflow, processing, cross-agency transfers, and the like, is much
larger than the issue of restrictions upon dissemination of file documents. For several years up to and including passage of the 1980
Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), 25 there was extensive discussion of a

central management responsibility for paperwork control.' 26 As the
topic evolved, information management and paperwork control have
become interlocked concepts. But there are qualitative differences between the "paperwork issue" and the problems of administering a dis-

closure policy.
"Paperwork" limitations generally look at the control of inflow,
rather than output. Disclosure issues often arise ad hoc on a variable

set of facts, with a problem initiated outside of the agency, by a request

under the FOIA or the Privacy Act.' 27 Paperwork limitations deal at
the policy level with systemic problems. The issues are bridged somewhat in the broad powers of the PRA, which give the OMB a statutory
guidance responsibility for both
inflow and disclosure of information
28
received by federal agencies.'
The paperwork imposed on state and local governments and the
private sector by federal agencies is enormous. 1 29 Much of its bulk is

regulatory in nature, enforced by penalties requiring the submission of
documents which are in turn used to produce adjudicative decisions or
license renewals. 130 A significant amount of the submitted forms and
125. Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2813 (1980) (to be codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 et seq.).
126. See the following works, all by the COMMISSION ON FEDERAL PAPERWORK: FINAL SUMMARY REPORT (1977); THE PROCESS CLEARANCE PROCESS (1977); CONFIDENTIALITY AND
PRIVACY (1977); HISTORY OF PAPERWORK REFORM EFFORTS (1977); INFORMATION RE-

127.

128.
129.
130.

SOURCES MANAGEMENT (1977). See also The FederalPaperworkBurdex Identiying the Major Problems: HearingsBefore Senate Comm on Govt. Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981)
[hereinafter cited as 1981 Paperwork Burden Hearings].
COMMISSION ON FEDERAL PAPERWORK, CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVACY (1977). The
agency cannot predict its own caseload because each FOI or Privacy Act request comes in
from an outside source, and each carries the same 10-day response requirement, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (1976). So a major merger will add to FTC request demands, while a new
drug introduction attracts usually 25-30 new requests at FDA from competitors.
44 U.S.C.A. § 3501 et seq. (West Supp. 1982).
COMMISSION ON FEDERAL PAPERWORK, FINAL SUMMARY REPORT 5 (1977).
Id See also Paperwork and Redtape Reduction Act of 1979: Hearings on . 1411 Before
Subconmm on FederalSpending Practicesand Open Gov't of the Senate Comm on Gov'tAffs.,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); The FederalPaperworkBurden. Identifying the MajorProblems:
Hearings Before Subcomar on Federal Spending Practices and Open Gov't of the Senate
Comn Gov'tAffs., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 PaperworkBurden
Hearings];andEfforts to Reduce FederalPaperworkBurdens: HearingsBefore the Subconma
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reports appears unnecessary from the standpoint of practical utility in
an agency function. The Commission on Federal Paperwork conducted an excellent study of the issue in 1975-77 and its recommendations were 13widely acclaimed for their thoughtful and useful
conclusions. 1
The coincidence of paperwork and FOIA issues was in part personal and in part institutional. Rep. Frank Horton (R-N.Y.), most active legislative sponsor and Chairman of the Commssion on Federal
Paperwork was also an active sponsor of the 1974 FOIA amendments. 132 OMB Director Bert Lance and Comptroller General Elmer
Staats were also members of the Paperwork Commission, thus bringing
active OMB and General Accounting Office (GAO) representation to
the Commission's findings. 133 Institutionally, problems which the
by policy
agencies had with collection of information were paralleled
134
problems concerning disclosure of that same information.
Some critics of the information disclosure policy of the agencies
under the FOIA saw the Paperwork Commission as a forum for action.
But the issues of process and of standards were differentiable. Charges
were made that the Commission "suppressed" a staff member's draft
report on disclosure policy, which had favored greater disclosure than
the Commission members desired. 135 Revision of the disclosure policy
but the final report on that issue
draft was argued in the newspapers,
136
appears to be a credible study.
The Paperwork Reduction Act
The PRA, despite its politically appealing title, was a legislative
"long shot" in 1980 when it achieved passage.' 37 Prime movers in obtaining passage were Sen. Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.), and Reps. Frank
Horton (R-N.Y.) and Jack Brooks (D-Tx.). The bills they proposed
would give the OMB considerably greater authority than it had under
the former Federal Reports Act.' 38 The key Senate control over bills
affecting federal information administration was held by Sen. Abraham
Ribicoff (D-Conn.), who did not share the views of the legislation's
on FederalSpending Practices and Open Gov't of the Senate Comm on Gov't Affs., 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
131. COMMISSION ON FEDERAL PAPERWORK, FINAL SUMMARY REPORT (1977).
132. d See FOIA SOURCEBOOK, supra note 74.
133. The law which created the Commission on Federal Paperwork required the OMB to study
implementation of the CFP findings. Pub. L. No. 93-556 § 3(d), 88 Stat. 1789 (1974).
134. See COMMISSION ON FEDERAL PAPERWORK, REPORT ON CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVACY
(1977).
135. Paperwork PanelTones Down Secrecy Report, Washington Star, Sept. 28, 1977, at A3.
136. COMMISSION ON FEDERAL PAPERWORK, REPORT ON CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVACY

(1977).
137. By itself, the political history of the Paperwork Reduction Act is significant as an indication
of the disputes which often arise toward the end of the legislative session, particularly with

controversial bills.

138. The former act had many weaknesses and its deficiencies were studied extensively by the
CFP. COMMISSION ON FEDERAL PAPERWORK, REPORT ON THE REPORTS CLEARANCE PROcEss (1977) and REPORT ON HISTORY OF PAPERWORK REFORM EFFORTS (1977).
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sponsor in favor of central authority for clearing agency forms and for
controlling acquisition of information. 13 9 Ribicofis version of the regulatory reform legislation' 4° held the primary attention of his committee, and limitation
of OMB powers in the latter bills was a source of
14
heavy debate.

1

The PRA had Administration support, led by the OMB, which
stood to gain in authority from its adoption. 42 The groundwork for the
passage of the PRA was completed, 143 but the bill stalled in the Senate
before the November elections. 4 That 1980 election year marked the
change from a Democratic to a Republican dominated Senate, so the
Democratic majority had an incentive to pass the legislation before departing in 1980.145 With the usual last-minute maneuvering, the bill
was adopted.
No legislation of the magnitude of the PRA can go through without
problems. While the PRA was pending for a floor vote in the Senate,
Alan Morrison of Public Citizen Litigation Group became concerned
that OMB authority might be abused. 146 He communicated his concern to Senator Edward Kennedy's (D-Mass.) staff; Patti Saris, legislative counsel for Kennedy, drafted a proposed Kennedy amendment. 47
The PRA, as it had passed in committee, would have given the OMB
authority to overrule a regulation after it had been subject to the Administrative Procedure Act notice and comment procedures.14 8 The
veto authority worried Morrison and Saris, as it could give opponents
of a rule yet another forum in which to kill a regulation, 149 and one
139. Interviews with several former committee staff aides suggested that Ribicoff was skeptical of
the PRA concept, and preferred the Regulatory Reform Act, his bill, as a systemic change to
agency practices.
140. S. 262, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
141. See SENATE COMM. ON GOVT. AFFS. AND SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REFORM OF
FEDERAL REGULATION, S. REPT. No. 1018, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); Neustadt, The Administration'sRegulatory Reform Program, 32 AD. L. REV. 129 (1980).
142. Senator Lawton Chiles, principal sponsor of the bill, worked closely with the Administration
to unify the bill's supporters and move the bill ahead. Telephone interviews with Robert
Coakley, Prof. StaffMember, Subcomm. on Federal Expenditures, Research & Rule, Senate
Comm. on Govt'l Affs. (July 1982).
143. The groundwork was an extensive set of hearings and the final report of the COMMISSION ON
FEDERAL PAPERWORK, FINAL SUMMARY REPORT (1977). This was done and all preparations for passage were complete well before the elections. Interview with Coakley, supra
note 142.
144. This decreased the chances of the bill's passage, but Democratic staff members, recognizing
their upcoming change from majority to minority, redoubled efforts to move it promptly out
of the Senate and into law. Interview with Coakley, id; interview with James Graham, former aide to the Senate Comm. on Govt. Affs. (July 1982).
145. These views were shared also by the Kennedy staff. Telephone interviews with Patti Saris,
former aide to Sen. Kennedy, and Thomas Susman, former General Counsel to the Administrative Practices Subcommittee chaired by Sen. Kennedy (July 1982).
146. Telephone interview with Alan Morrison (July 1982).
147. Id and interview with Patti Saris, supra note 145.
148. The section of concern empowered OMB to "ensure that in developing rules and regulations,
agencies" use efficient collection means, allow comment on the means of collection and assess consequences of alternative collection means. S. 1411, proposed 44 U.S.C. § 3504(h),
126 CONG. REC. S14684 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1980).
149. Interview with Alan Morrison, supra note 146. For example, an opponent of a railroad regulation would attack it at OMB by arguing the means of collection of the rule-related
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which was ex parte and outside of the public view.' 50
Terms of the Kennedy amendment to the PRA were hammered out
in tough negotiations late into a weekend evening. OMB would agree
to limit itself to participation on the record in any notice and comment
15 1
rulemaking which involved a PRA-regulated information activity.
OMB could not veto the content of a rule after it has been made final
simply because of dissatisfaction with that content, unless OMB follows
specific procedures including publicly available comments.1 52 The
OMB's comment procedures had been controversial and had been ex153 and by the
tensively studied, both by the Paperwork Commission
54
1
congressional staffs which now handled the PRA.
During the legislative debate over the Kennedy amendment, the
staff compromise which emerged was acceptable to both Kennedy and
the OMB. 55 Though sponsors of the amendment to limit OMB power
in the rulemaking field expected OMB to fight the result, the OMB
acquiesced, perhaps because the load of regulations to be reviewed and
resulting need to listen to the demands of any rule's opponents were
seen as too heavy a burden for too slight a benefit.' 56 The Kennedy
amendment gives a pace and structure to the participation by OMB in
agencies' informal rulemaking.157 However, the amendment's less forof the
tunate consequence is that it has fed ammunition to obstruction
5
1
OMB.
the
of
opponents
political
of
part
the
on
PRA
paperwork from railroads was too burdensome and an alternative should have been chosen.
OMB would then decide about the alternative and whether agency consideration of it had
been fair. Or reversal could be sought for procedural noncompliance.
150. Interview with Morrison, id See C. Ludlam in REPORT BY ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE-UNDERMINING PUBLIC PROTECTIONS

(1981).

151. See final version at 44 U.S.C.A. § 3504(h) (West Supp. 1982).
152. Id at § 3504(h)(4).
153. COMMISSION ON FEDERAL PAPERWORK, REPORT ON RULEMAKING (1977).

154. Those staffs were simultaneously working toward a compromise on Regulatory Reform Act,
S. 262, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), but none was eventually reached.
155. Interviews with Morrison, supra note 146; Saris, supra note 145; Graham, supra note 144;
Coakley, supra note 142; and Robert Bedell, Deputy General Counsel, OMB (June 1982).
156. This was the rationale offered by Senate Staff, no statement on the record was available from
OMB on this issue.
157. The involvement has been generally successful. Interview with Nat Scurry, Chief, Reports
Branch, Office of Information & Regulatory Affairs, OMB (August 1982). There have been
occasional disagreements, see 1 INSIDE OMB NEWSLETTER July 2, 1982, at 4 (IRS disagreement with OMB); Feaver, IRS and OMB Wage Paper War Over Tust, Washington Post,
May 12, 1981, at A21. See also Office of Legal Counsel, Dept. of Justice, Opinion Letter re
Paperwork Reduction Act, to C. Boyden Gray, June 22, 1982. The opinion is excerpted in
Moore, DOJ Restricts OMB's PaperReview Power, Legal Times of Washington, June 28,
1982, at 1. See also Noble, Budget Ojice.Accepts TightenedBank Rules, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8,
1982, at 27.
158. The restriction on rulemaking comments did not upset the OMB; that Office's public papers
expressing opinions on new rules are available for public inspection in an agency reading
room. Interview with Bedell, supra note 155. But OMB involvement with rulemaking has
strong opponents. Alan Morrison, Director of Public Citizen Litigation Group, is in general
agreement with the recent opinions of the Justice Department placing limitations on OMB
authority, Office of Legal Counsel, interview with Morrison, supra note 146; former Carter
White House Assistant Charles Ludlam is very critical of OMB, REPORT BY THE ALLIANCE
FOR JUSTICE-UNDERMINiNG PUBLIC PROTECTIONS" (1981). See also National Tank Truck
Carriers Inc. v. OMB, 1982 Fed. Carr. Cas. (CCH) 83,004 (D.D.C. May 28, 1982) (denying
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Though the Kennedy amendment debate is secondary to the PRA's

"privacy functions" for purposes of this article,159 the debate illustrates
how some members of the Congress were made sensitive to the ramifi-

cations of the new OMB authorities, and how Congress made conscious
choices to preserve some OMB powers and limit others in the final

PRA. Functions like the privacy powers of OMB were not mere accidents. And the Kennedy amendment incident teaches a lesson relevant

to our study of disclosure policy: interesting policy choices attract
OMB attention; tedious adjudicative assignments are likely to be
shunned by OMB managers.
The DOJ was not an active participant in the PRA legislative devel-

opment; its Office of Legal Counsel was concentrating on the Regulatory Reform Act at the time the PRA was passed. 160 The Department's

non-involvement may have caused some lack of understanding of the
PRA later, according to the DOJ's critics.1 6 1 In light of subsequent

events, it is curious to note that much of the paperwork reduction
power which the statute had given to OMB, with Sen. Kennedy's blessing, 16 2 was later "interpreted away" from OMB by the DOJ's Office of

Legal Counsel. 163 A residuum of bad feelings appears to exist over the
DOJ's 1982 interpretations of the PRA.164

The intrusions intended to be controlled by the PRA are not limited

159.
160.

161.

162.
163.

164.

disclosure of OMB staff memoranda). For a defense of OMB action on environmental rules,
see Profile-OMB'sJim Joseph Tozzi, ENVTL. F., May, 1982, at 11.
The Kennedy amendment, 44 U.S.C. § 3504(h), follows the privacy functions segment,
§ 3504(f), but the privacy functions segment drew little attention in floor debates.
Justice was vigorously supporting some aspects and vigorously opposing some aspects of the
Regulatory Reform Act, S. 262, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). See also O'Reilly, Deference
Makes .4 Dfference." The Bump.ers JudicialReview 4mendment, 49 U. CIN. L. REv. 739
(1980); Letter of Atty. Gen. Civiletti to Chmnn. Peter Rodino, House Judiciary Comm., May
14, 1980 (discussing amendments to Regulatory Reform Act).
For example, the lengthy commentary against the OMB authority under the Paperwork Reduction Act appeared to ignore a vital piece of interpretative history. Justice found ambiguities in the legislative history but did not address at all Sen. Kennedy's Senate floor speech
concerning his amendment, which appears to run contra to the positions taken by Justice.
Office of Legal Counsel opinion letter, supra note 157. See Kennedy speech, 126 CONG.
Rnc. S16,700 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1980). There may be a different interpretation from the
GAO. Interview with Coakley, supra note 142, and Letter of Sen. L. Chiles to Charles Bowsher, Comptroller General, July 1982.
Much of OMB's view of the Act centered upon its ability to control existing paperwork
requirements in existing rules. The power to involve itself with new rules had been affected
by the Kennedy amendment, 44 U.S.C.A. § 3504(h) (West Supp. 1981).
The Kennedy amendment, 44 U.S.C.A. § 3504(h), was the section most impacted by the
Justice Department opinion. Where the OMB had considered it a basis for action, Justice
did "not believe that § 3504(h) establishes a procedural mechanism for the review of existing
regulations." Letter of Asst. Atty. Gen. Olson to C. Boyden Gray, Michael J. Horowitz, of
the OMB, and Peter Wallison, of the Dept. of Treasury, June 22, 1982, accompanying Office
of Legal Counsel opinion letter, supra note 157.
Interviews with OMB officials in July 1982, shortly after the opinion was received but before
it became a public controversy, revealed a significant disagreement with the content and
conclusions of the Justice letter. The strong feelings differed with the interpretation as a
matter of statutory construction, with the failure to consider the overall intent of the PRA,
and with the omission of several considerations deemed relevant by OMB. However, the
strong feelings were not expressed for the public record because negotiations were underway
to settle the disagreement. A settlement was reached and the Proposed Rule on the PRA was
issued in the Federal Register, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,515 (1982).
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to the context of the individual, as the Privacy Act language had appeared to limit that earlier statute. 65 Of significance is the PRA expansion of "privacy" from a concept of an individualpersonal privacy,1 66 to

that of an entity having privacy interests.' 67 The privacy role has been
expanded to business and labor and other institutions whose "privacy,"
in the broadest sense, is affected by information collections subject to
the PRA.' 68 This had been a subject of some controversy under the
Privacy Act, with the courts overruling OMB and
holding in favor of
1 69
greater "privacy" for entrepreneurial activities.

Overall responsibility for the PRA was delegated by Congress to the
OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.' 70

This Office

was given important management powers by the Act 17 1 and by the Executive Order entrusting regulatory reform efforts to OMB management.' 72 The guidelines adopted by OMB under its new PRA privacy
functions would bind the agencies in their privacy protection functions.

These guidelines could be an important
foundation for a cohesive ad73
ministration policy on disclosure.
165. 44 U.S.C.A. § 3502(14) (West Supp. 1982).
166. This was the Privacy Act's sole direction, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(2) (1976).
167. The PRA is directed to institutional burdens as well as individual ones, in light of the Hearings record which underlay its adoption from which business complaints could be heard,
1979 PaperworkBurden Hearings,supra note 130, and was part of the privacy concept of the
pre-legislation. COMMISSION ON FEDERAL PAPERWORK, FINAL SUMMARY REPORT (1977).
168. Compare the statutory expansion from Privacy Act "individual," 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(2)
(1976), to Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C.A. § 3502(14) (West Supp. 1982).
169. Metadure Corp. v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 1368 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Florida Medical Ass'n
v. Dept. of HEW, 479 F. Supp. 1291. (M.D. Fla. 1979); Zeller v. United States, 467 F. Supp.
487 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). OMB will continue to oppose these types of cases and refuses to
amend its 1975 decisions. Interview with C. Wirtz, OMB (June 1982); but see 2 J. O'REILLY,
supra note 5, § 20.05.
170. 44 U.S.C.A. at § 3503 (West Supp. 1982).
171. Id at § 3504.
172. Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 11.
173. 44 U.S.C.A. § 3504() (West Supp. 1982); and these guidelines are to be complemented by
legislative proposals, id at § 3505(3)(F).
OMB could deal with the tension of collection and security through the PRA. In a large
number of cases, OMB could reduce information collection demands through the PRA. A
rare item included in the Paperwork Reduction Act is a set of quantitative performance
guidelines which OMB must meet. 44 U.S.C.A. § 3505(1) (West Supp. 1982).
As an example of how the OMB could use the PRA to reduce informations demands, the
average World War II veteran is now reaching an age at which Veterans Administration
medical care benefits associated with diseases of the elderly can be important individual
benefits. But recipients are as proud as any other Americans about their independence from
intrusions on their family privacy. With the acquisition of Paperwork Reduction Act authority on top of the existing Privacy Act roles, for example, the OMB can affect the extent to
which indigent veterans must supply family income statistics to the Veterans Administration
as a precondition for admission to a VA nursing home. Or the VA may wish to disseminate
information on its projection of county by county Oklahoma indigent nursing home aid recipients to stimulate the financing of new nursing homes in that state. OMB's privacy functions, combined with its overall sense of the informational "mission" given it in the PRA,
make OMB an important privacy protector. The Privacy Act role is reconfirmed in express
language in the Paperwork Reform Act, 44 U.S.C.A. § 3504(f(3) (West Supp. 1982).
By questioning the proposed VA release either under the Privacy Act itself, if it applies
(the VA would have to possess the records in a "system of records" for the Privacy Act to
apply, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5)), or under the PRA delegation of privacy powers (44 U.S.C.
§ 3504(t)), the OMB exercises an affirmative privacy protection responsibility which it did
not have under the 1974 Privacy Act alone.
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Interaction of the Paperwork Reduction Act and the Freedom Of
Information Act
During the consideration of the PRA, Comptroller General Elmer
Staats, who had been a member of the Commission on Federal
Paperwork, recommended to Congress that the OMB should be given
authority over the FOIA, as well as over the PRA, the Privacy Act, and
other relevant information legislation. Staats observed that "better
oversight and executive direction can improve implementation" and
that giving OMB "specific policy setting responsibility for the Freedom
of Information Act will provide this much-needed executive direction
and oversight."'' 74 The recommendation
was based on a GAO study of
75
the operation of the FOIA.
Congress came close to granting Staats' wish, with the House offering OMB an Office of Federal Information Policy 176 and the Senate
vesting new "privacy powers" in OMB. 177 Congress also had before it
various scholarly suggestions, 78 and a few legislative proposals for centralized FOIA management. 79 It is clear that before the PRA's adoption, Congress had considered on several occasions the issue of central
control of information disclosure policy. Comptroller General Staats
was not alone in considering OMB as a central focus of the FOIA.
Indeed, centralization discussions were part of the 1979-80 Regulatory
Reform Act debate. 8 ' The version of the Regulatory Reform Act
which failed in late 1980, at the same time the PRA was adopted,
would have centralized the FOIA, but in the Administrative Conference. 18 ' That suggestion was not revived in 1981.182
A contrast in FOIA and PRA legislative aspects is instructive. The
83
DOJ was most active with the FOIA, and OMB was virtually silent.
OMB was most active with the PRA, and the DOJ was virtually silent. 184 For direct power, the FOIA gives none to any agency, 8 5 while
174. Hearingson PaperworkReduction Act of 1980before House Comm. on Govt. Operations,96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1980).
175. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AN INFORMED PUBLIC ASSURES THAT FEDERAL AGENCIES
WILL BETTER COMPLY WITH FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRiVACY LAWS (1979) (No. LCD-

80-8).
176. PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT, H.R. Doc. No. 835, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1980).
177. 44 U.S.C.A. § 3504(f) (West Supp. 1982). The Senate bill was the dominant bill.
178. Miller & Cox, On the Needfor a National Commission on Documentary Access, 44 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 213 (1976); Koch & Rubin,A Proposalfor.4Comprehensive Restructuringof
the Public Information System, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1, 58 (1979).
179. S.262 & S.2147, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
180. The statutory proposals, id, were addressed in Hearings on Reguiation Reform Act of 1979
Before the Senate ComAh. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1002 (1980).
181. S.262, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
182. The FOIA issues were deleted from the legislation which appeared in 1981. Regulatory
Reform Act, S. 1080, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
183. See the history of the 1974 amendments in FOIA SOURCEBOOK, supra note 74. OMB had a
very small role regarding fees and user charges.
184. Involvement of Justice does not appear in the Senate hearings. Each of those interviewed in
the Senate staff group which produced the final statute, and in OMB, were asked about
Justice's role and none could recall any activity on the Department's part.
185. The FOIA gives no authority to any federal agency, except for the filing of reports of activity.
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the PRA gives great power to the OMB. 18 6 For reporting obligations,
the OMB and the DOJ must file FOTA reports, with the DOJ's report

marginally larger. 18 7 The DOJ won rather cryptic statutory language
in the FOIA amendments on its encouragement efforts in advising the
reporting agencies, but no statutory power.' 88 The DOJ included in the
legislative history of the PRA an equally cryptic reservation of authority, 8 9 but again no statutory authority to go with the reservation. So
cryptic was the PRA reference to the Department's prior work that
none of the OMB officials interviewed and none of the 1980 active staff
drafting team from the offices of Senators Chiles, Ribicoff, and Ken190
nedy remembered any reference to the DOJ in the Senate Report.
The insertion was made at the behest of the Department to preserve its

options when the PRA implementation began.' 9 ' The PRA was like a
well-fortified OMB position; the bureaucratic guerilla attack which inserted the DOJ preservation comment may have been so silent an at-

tack as 92to carry no historical weight, when and if future combat

ensues. 1
The DOJ can still refuse to litigate and can threaten to dismiss its
client's defense in court. 93 That threat is rarely executed. 194 The "en-

couragement" function promised in 1973 and delivered late in that dec186. See, e.g., 44 U.S.C.A. § 3504 (West Supp. 1982).
187. 5 U.S.C. § 552(d) (1976).
188. The function of the report in 5 U.S.C. § 552(d) appears to be to bring public attention to the

numbers of cases which Justice had not prevented from coming to litigation. Justice was
attacked by Ralph Nader and others; the reporting was agreed to as a step to lessen this lack

of openness, and by spotlighting Justice, to give an incentive for more settlements and dispositions of disputes. The 1974 legislative history is anything but a ringing endorsement of the
Department's FOIA role. AMENDING THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, S. REP. No.
584, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1974).

189. "Section 3504(f) describes the functions related to. . . guidelines both on information disclosure and confidentiality .... The Director is to provide advice and guidance to the agencies concerning information... disclosure, and monitor compliance with the Privacy Act
and other related information management laws. The Director's privacy functions do not
affect the responsibility of the Department of Justice to encourage agency compliance with
the Freedom of Information Act as set forth in 5 USC 552(d)." PAPERWORK REDUCTION
ACT OF 1980, S. REP. No. 930, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 42 (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6241.

190. Interviews, supra notes 142-146, with Coakley, Graham, Saris, Susman, Bedell, and Scurry.
191. Former Justice Department FOI Committee Chairman Robert Saloschin asked that the Justice legislative office insert the statement and it was inserted as an accomodation by someone
at some time prior to the filing of the Report on September 8, 1980. Telephone interview
with Saloschin, supra note 113.
192. Judicial deference to legislative history varies with the weight, pervasiveness, consistency
with overall intent, and historical basis of the cited piece of legislative history. Apparently
none of the Senators themselves knew of the clause In the Report, which is not atypical for
reports filed immediately after the summer recess concludes, and none of the key staff members assigned to the bill recalled it. Because the content of the Justice insertion relates back
to the 1974 legislative history, the content does not on its face exclude a policy role for the
OMB in FOIA matters, but it would exclude OMB from filing a new piece of little-read
paperwork, beyond the FOIA litigation reports required under 5 U.S.C. § 552(d). See the
history of the 1974 amendments in FOIA SOURCEBOOK, supra note 74.
193. The 1979 policy statement, supra note 110, has apparently not been revoked, but the routine
review of denials faded away in the late 1970's notwithstanding the published policy and the
Department looked only at the "tough cases." Braeman, supra note 55, at 114.
194. Only four such cases existed in 1977 and apparently few if any such refusals occur now. 1977
FOI Hearings,supra note 8, at 933.
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ade 195 is worth praise and preservation. But since the call for a policy
role at OMB does not interfere with the litigators at the DOJ, there is
doubt about what the Department was trying to preserve. In other areas of federal policy, such as lands and water policy and environmental
control, the DOJ's ability to decline prosecution or recommend settling
196
cases does not usurp the lead agency's role in policy formulation.
For future interpretative weight, then, the DOJ non-interference
comment is curious. The Senate Report's obscure comment 197 was virtually invisible to the staff authors of the legislative compromise. Had
the comment been focused better, the issue of relative OMB and DOJ
roles might have been joined and statutory language in the PRA might
have been included in the final text of the statute. When considering a
legislative scheme as broad as the information policy powers of the
PRA, an innocuous "does not affect" mention in a committee report
bears little weight. And the comment has no resemblance to the commanding tones sometimes invoked for FOIA disclosure requirements
by the Congress.' 98
The DOJ had not been given central authority in the congressional
enactments, but its staff cared about preserving the de facto advisory
role. 199 It seems to be partly a case of bureaucratic self-preservation
and partly a systemic suspicion of OMB. The "privacy powers" over
disclosure granted to OMB in that PRA textual statement include powers to set guidelines on disclosure of information. 200 No other statute
has given a comprehensive disclosure control mandate to any centralized agency. 20 ' So what would the consequences be to federal information policy if OMB took on the new power, and what would be the
consequences for the DOJ?
FUTURE OF THE INFORMATION POLICY AND
PRIVACY FUNCTIONS

The future direction of the federal government's information policy
boils down to three principal questions:
(1) Is an information disclosure policy needed to implement the terms
of the Paperwork Reduction Act?
(2) If so, should a central agency establish that policy, and should a
central agency monitor agency compliance?
195. Id
196. The changes in policy which decided cases engender are not the same as having the litigation

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

agency responsible for proactively setting the policy which is administered by the clients
prior to litigation.
S. REPT. No. 930, supra note 189.
Congress does not spare words when it wishes to address the right to know and the public
policy implications of the FOIA. See FOIA SOURCEBOOK, supra note 74.
Telephone interview with Saloschin, supra note 113.
44 U.S.C.A. § 3504() (West Supp. 1982).
The closest equivalent, the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976 & Supp. I 1978), is a statute
which uses OMB guidelines but which is delimited by narrow statutory definitions.
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(3) If so, is legislation needed to designate such a central agency, and
what agency should perform that role?
Is an Information Disclosure Policy Needed?
An information disclosure policy is a systematic determination of
how the federal government should make decisions regarding disclosure of information received by government from outside sources such
as state governments, unions, corporations, schools, individuals, etc.
One who confesses a bias in favor of the rights of the person regulated

over the powers of the regulator will probably endorse the creation of

policies to control the irrevocable actions of the regulator.2 "2 Policies

which systematize the actions of the regulator appear to produce a societal benefit.
Organizations, like people, learn from their experiences. If the fed-

eral agency's disclosure of the organization's information adversely affects one of its important interests, such as the recruitment of new

members by a textile union,20 3 the future sharing of information with

the federal government is likely to be inhibited. 2" The discretion of

the person submitting information, and the discretion of the agency receiving it are each affected by disclosure policy decisions. The Con-

gress sometimes dictates that policy by law. The Privacy Act is a
typical disclosure policy statute 20 5 wherein discretion and its exercise
For example, under OMB guidelines, and
vary among the agencies.
rules of the Centers for Disease Control, the government will not make
20 7

public names of venereal disease patients treated in a CDC study.
Students of the federal information laws would agree that no cen-

202. Secrets of a business firm are lost irrevocably when disclosed. See, e.g., General Motors v.

Marshall, 654 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1981).
203. Union authorization cards, signed during a recruitment drive, have been a major source of
FOIA disputes, in which the FOIA has been an unintended tool of discovery threatening the
private communications of unions and their members prior to the public announcement of
the unionization. Madeira Nursing Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 615 F.2d 728 (6th Cir. 1980),
American Airlines, Inc. v. Nat'l Mediation Board, 588 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1978), Committee
on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1977). See J. O'REILLY, UNIONS'
RIGHTS TO COMPANY INFORMATION 195 (1980).

204. National Parks Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974) set the
principle followed by Board of Trade of Chicago v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n,
27 F.2d 392 (D.C. Cir. 1980), Orion Research Inc. v. EPA, 615 F.2d 551 (1st Cir. 1980) and
Miller, Anderson, Nash, Yerke & Wiener v. Dept. of Energy, 499 F. Supp. 767 (D. Or. 1980).
205. The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976 & Supp. I 1978), represents a conscious policy
choice which, where it is applicable, precludes the exercise of disclosure discretion under one
of the exemptions to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976). Note, The
Privacy Act of 1974, 1971 DUKE L.J. 301 (1976); Project, Government Information and the
Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REv. 971, 1303 (1975).
206. The agency position on exercise of disclosure discretion ranges widely across all agencies on
related information, from the National Security Agency at one extreme to the Food and
Drug Administration at the other. Agencies are free to disclose even though the information
is exempt unless another statute prevented disclosure. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281
(1979); 1 J. O'REILLY, supra note 5, § 9.05.
207. However, it would have discretion to do so if they were not in a "system of records," 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(a) (1976 & Supp. H 1978).
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tral information policy now exists.2 °8 The FOIA contains the limits of
discretion,
compelling some information to be available to the public. 20 9 But its exemptions are vague discretionary entitlements, beset
with ambiguities. 1 0 Other specific statutes, like the Federal Trade
Commission Act,2" 1 ' require specific types of information to remain
nondisclosed. 1 2 Between the two extremes is the area for discretion,
but that area has no central policy guidance. An information policy
governs the standards by which discretion to disclose will be exercised.
It is not an administrator's repeal of Congress' mandatory disclosure or
mandatory confidentiality provisions.2 1 3 Rather, it informs discretion
and makes it more uniform in execution.
One frequently litigated omission from the FOIA has been any protection for the rights of private persons. The Act is an excellent disclosure vehicle for government generated information revealing
government's workings and decisions.21 4 The mass of private documents required to be filed are also agency records, but they are overlooked in the Act's current procedures. 5
The DOJ has argued against submitter challenges to agency discretionary disclosure. 216 In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown 2 17 and Cell Associates
v. NationalInstitutes of Health,218 government counsel successfully asserted that the FOIA's business privacy exemption and its individual
208. "Government-wide direction does not exist and I think it probably should." 1977 FOIHearings, supra note 8, at 149.
209. Disclosure is required unless the power to withhold is specifically stated in an exemption. 5
U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976 & Supp. 11 1978); Dept. of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976);
County of Madison v. Dept. of Justice, 641 F.2d 1036 (lst Cir. 1981).
210. For example, the word "confidential" as a descriptor usually means that nondisclosure is
expected. This was the content given the term by the 1965 Senate Report, S. REP. No. 813,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965), as it appears in exemption 4, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976).
From its exemption standard based upon expectations, the courts moved the exemption standard into one of quantification of injuries. That produced such extensive economic proofs as
seen in a 1981-82 lawsuit, 1981 FOI Hearings,supra note 61, at 620. Until the statute is
revisited by Congress, and confirmed as an expectations standard, the exemption will continue to be quantification based. National Parks Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d
765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974). For a statutory suggestion, see S. 1730, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1981)
and Administrative Conference recommendation, 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-1.
211. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41 to 58 (1976, Supp. II 1978, & West Supp. 1982).
212. 15 U.S.C.A. § 57b-2 (West Supp. 1982) protects information obtained during FTC
investigations.
213. An administrative agency can neither repeal a statute which precluded disclosure, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(3) (1976), nor repeal the disclosure mandate of the FOIA itself. So an information
policy addresses the wide interstices between these two bounds of action but will not exceed
them.
214. The Act had a very salutary effect on disclosure of internal operations and workings of federal agencies. As discussed at the outset of this article, an information disclosure policy
would be directed, as the Paperwork Reduction Act is directed, to items coming in to the
government from outside.
215. A debate about the extent and significance of the omission appears in a seminar issue on
FOIA and commercial data, 34 AD. L. REv. 159-182; 207-314 (1982).
216. See Dept. of Justice, Office of Information Law & Policy, Policy Discussion: Business Confidentiality after Chrysler, 2 FOIA UPDATE 3 (Winter 1980).
217. Chrysler argued that the FOIA itself was a basis for a challenge against a proposed disclosure by an agency. The Court agreed, but found an Administrative Procedure Act remedy.
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
218. Cell Associates, Inc. v. Nat'l Institutes of Health, 579 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1978).
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privacy exemption do not provide a legal basis for a challenge to the
agency's discretionary decision to disclose a piece of private information, such as a chemical formula required to be submitted by a private
person to a regulatory agency. Challenges to agency discretion can be
fought only with agency-by-agency litigation in federal district courts,
as part of APA appeals of discretionary disclosure decisions. 219 These
challenge the arbitrariness of the exercise of discretion, but are precarious assaults if the agency has ably covered its flanks on the matter of
discretion. 2 °
This FOIA omission affords private persons only an awkward and
uncertain means of challenge against the vagaries of agency disclosure
discretion. The form or report submitter must know that the disclosure
is occurring, a matter not now included in the law.22 1 The agency employee making disclosure decisions must have a policy of some sort to
follow and must be capable of following that policy.
In a minority of
cases, central control of discretion makes the conduct of both submitter
and discloser predictable. Those who make a compelling case that the
discretion has been eliminated by a specific statute, such as the Privacy
Act, 223 will fare slightly better in agency practice and in litigation

against an agency. But as a systemic matter it would be much easier for
all concerned to have a central policy on disclosure issues.
An information policy which takes into account business and personal privacy needs at both the collection stage and the disclosure stage
would be a great improvement over the present state of federal information law. A central policy would have several advantages. It could
be a vehicle for deciding which varieties of private documents will receive confidential treatment. It could uniformly apply procedural
rights for private submitters. 224 It could "clean up" many of the omissions in the FOIA. Because government usually loses nothing when
disclosure of private documents occurs (the loss of licensable value or
market advantage falls upon the owner,225 not the agency),226 a per219. Chrysler, 441 U.S. 281. However, the Justice Department was willing to ask Congress to
amend the FOIA to bring in more procedural rights under that Act for submitters. S. 1751,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). That statutory change was less than the Hatch bill, S. 1730, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) and ultimately neither passed the Senate.
220. An agency can create a "record" via form letters which state the proper phrasing but reflect
no conscientious assessment of the facts or policy underlying the disputed adjudication.
That frustrates both the meaning of the process and the individual submitter. O'Reilly,
Regaininga Confidence: Protection ofBusiness ConfidentialData Through Reform ofthe Freedom of InformationAct, 34 AD. L. REv. 263 (1982).
221. Present law does not require notice to the submitter before disclosure occurs. See Recommendations of the Administrative Conference, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,701, 30,702 (1982).
222. The elements of executing any policy are a definition of goals, a rule to follow, and a level of
implementing officials who are capable of carrying it out judiciously. To the extent that the
agency subdelegates the disclosure decision to local office staff members, the variable outcomes will be even more divetse.
223. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
224. These procedural uniformity ideals are enhanced by the recommendations of the Administrative Conference, 1 C.F.R. § 305.892-1.
225. Among the anticipated losses are costs of development, loss of sales, opportunity cost of not
having worked on a nonregulated (and hence nondisclosed product), and "lead time" in
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ceived imbalance exists in the motivations of agency decision-makers

who must choose whether to disclose or withhold.227 An information

policy could give guidance signals from above. The PRA
privacy func22

tions appear to empower OMB to create such a policy. 8
A central information policy should be general rather than specific.

When agencies reexamine their FOIA rules, as all agencies are ex229
pected to periodically review rules which have an external impact,
the agencies would have to amend their rules to take into account the
OMB procedures. 3 0 The costs of drafting the policy would be small
relative to the costs of individual agencies reconsidering their current
policies- 3 1 Those agencies not already in compliance would have a
marginally greater burden of educating their FOIA officers. There is
also a difference between the FOIA and the PRA in the source of stimuli for agency action. The PRA is best operated as a control on agencies and their practices,232 whereas disclosure issues have traditionally
been viewed as a matter of external stimulus, such as the FOIA request 233 and demands for Sunshine Act meeting access.2 34
On balance, a single information disclosure policy would seem to be

most fair, more efficient than current non-policies, and consistent with
the Paperwork Reduction Act.
Should there be a central policy drafting and monitoring agency?
The power to establish a central policy is not necessarily the same
as the enforcement of the policy. Litigation defense is the predominant
enforcement system for information disclosure matters. The DOJ will
remain in charge of litigation and pre-litigation counseling to help

agencies apply the policy to pre-litigation dispute situations in a defen-

sible manner.2 3 5 That role of the Department is not the creation of the
entering a market. For the best economic assessment, see 1981 FOlHearings,supra note 61,
at 639 (testimony of Casey, Marthinsen, and Moss).
226. The Federal Torts Claims Act does not compensate for intentional torts such as discretionary
disclosure of confidential private documents. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976).
227. See the ABA seminar debates on this topic in 34 AD. L. REv. 159-82, 207-314 (1982).
228. 44 U.S.C.A. § 3504(f) (West Supp. 1982). The policy can be created now, id, and legislation
to expand that policy must be drafted and submitted before April 1, 1983.
229. Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 11.
230. The Paperwork Reduction Act applies to independent agencies whether or not they are subject to the Executive Order 12,291 on regulatory reform, id See 44 U.S.C.A. § 3502(l) (West
Supp. 1982).
231. Among the options other than formulation of a central policy would be a directive to agencies to propose such disclosure policies for acceptance by OMB. This would make OMB
more of an informal adjudicator rather than a rule-maker.
232. The operations of the PRA will be internal to the federal government, for the most part.
OMB will serve as a check upon agencies, and regulated persons will be beneficiaries rather
than direct participants. That does not preclude the public from asking OMB's help, but
OMB needs no external stimulus to act under the PRA.
233. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)-(6) (1976).
234. Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified at 5
U.S.C. § 552b(f)(2) (1976)).
235. The Paperwork Reduction Act contains no provision limiting the case selection and defense
process.
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client's policy, but its informed defense. There is a difference which

ought not to be obscured.
The central nonstatutory involvement of the DOJ in acting de facto
to fill the FOIA guidance vacuum has been useful. It can be argued

that such a loosely decentralized, nondelegated power is satisfactory.
As information technology issues blossom, information control issues
become more complex and controversial. The episodic learning one

acquires from a litigation defense may be a proper "pull" factor for
policy, but it fails when asked to consistently and thoughtfully "push"
as a central policy would do.3 6 From the agency viewpoint, a consistent central
policy, with stability and sound advisors, is most
237
important.

Opponents of central policies would argue that disparate rules serve
well the needs of the agencies' particular constituencies. An agency
with an environmental constituency may best serve its constituents with
a policy different from that of an agency making public economic policy choices. The latter are vulnerable to instant defeat from premature
disclosures."3 Or it may be argued that a student loan program's release of financial statements of defaulting ex-students involves a different set of issues than an auditor's report of a union pension fund's
projected deficits. 2 3 9 Diverse discretion situations call for divergent implementation of the statute. And since the DOJ is the litigator it would
make sense to leave that Department as the advisor as well.240
Proponents of central authority would note first that submissions of
documents coming into the government from outside information
sources are at issue.24' Virtually all of these submitter sources deal
236. A choice to decide "rules" through adjudication only may lawfully be made, SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), but the agency must suffer a loss of communication ability when
it makes the means of passage of "law" to those regulated so obscure (by case precedents)
rather than so forthright by rules. See Huszagh and Huszagh, Productionand Consumption of
InformalLaw- 4 Modelfor Identifying Information Loss, 13 GA. L. REv. 515 (1979). This
communication difficulty is acute where agencies begin to pick up other agencies' adjudicated decisions as a premise for the recipient agency's later decisions, e.g. the USDA adjudicator operating on the basis of an EPA adjudicator's decisions, expanding the quantity of
precedent which one must follow to be up to date on the "law" of the USDA.
237. Telephone interview with Michelle Davis, FOIA legal adviser to the Treasury Department
(July 1982).
238. The immediate loss to the government from disclosure of the target purchase figures of the
key group of Federal Reserve banking officials, was asserted to be great. The Supreme Court
tailored a special exemption to the FOIA by reinterpretation of the intraagency memoranda
exemption, so this set of material could be protected. Federal Open Market Committee v.
Merrill, 443 U.S. 340 (1979).
239. The union's private records aid its opponents in bargaining, or in member recruitment, and
the union has some expectation (wherever permitted under federal labor law) of private
character for its records. A defaulter should expect that his or her default will be a matter of
public record. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. United States Small Business Admin., 670 F.2d 610
(5th Cir. 1982).
240. Advice to an agency to litigate or settle, because of the facts of a particular case, will be solely
within the control of the litigation managers at the Justice Department. The roles assigned to
OMB by the Paperwork Reduction Act as they impact information disclosure do not require
(and OMB does not wish) that OMB advise each agency on each disclosure issue. 44
U.S.C.A, §§ 3504(0, 3505(3)(F) (West Supp. 1982).
241. Government's own documents are not affected by this proposal. If government tested rifles
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with more than one agency.24 2 The dispersion of discretionary disclosure authority leads to friction about the proper withholding of private
documents, some of which are withheld in one agency and disclosed in
another.2 4 Expectations of how the government handles private sub-

missions are difficult or impossible to satisfy since so many different
policies apply. Since the PRA is directed to outsiders and their expec-

tations in dealing with government handling of information, 2'

it

makes sense to use the PRA to centrally define those external expecta-

tions. The policy must be flexible enough for different situations, but it
also should not be a policy driven by winning specific cases or adopting
a new24policy
as various Circuit's demands are factored into litigation
5
goals.

On balance, a central policy best serves those expectation interests
to which the PRA was directed. The expectation is that the person submitting documents will be treated fairly. 246 The information request
will have been screened by OMB. It will be authorized by the agency
after OMB clearance. 24 7 Its scope will not intrude at the collection or
dissemination stages upon privacy interests.24 8 If the expectation is not
met, excessive paperwork demands would continue and excessive intrusions into personal and entrepreneurial privacy would continue.2 49

242.
243.

244.
245.

246.
247.
248.

249.

on its own ranges, rifle test results would not be covered by this PRA policy just as the
Army's order to its arsenal to test the rifles would not be a PRA "information collection
request," 44 U.S.C.A. § 3502 (West Supp. 1982).
The best microcosm study of the federal regulatory system is PRESIDENT'S REORGANIZATION
PROJECT, THE VIEW FROM JANESVILLE, WISCONSIN (1978). See S. BREYER, REGULATION
AND ITS REFORM (1982).
A pharmaceutical plant is closely studied by its competitors for information about process
details and inactive ingredient identities, which are kept secret by the regulators at the Food
and Drug Administration, 21 C.F.R. § 314.14 (1982). But the same data is routinely available in the EPA files as emission data detailing the process and chemical studies available
under other EPA statutes.
PRA is aimed at reducing government's total demands for information from persons outside
the government.
It is commendable for a litigator with a winning record to suggest ways to prepare cases so
they, too, can be won. But is that all there is? Justice's own policy views have been directed
to the winnable, not the policy oversight of the federal government, and the two should be
distinguished by a detached policymaker. See DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FOIA UPDATE (issues
1979-82); 1977 FOIHearings supra note 8, at 933.
That goal is an implicit part of both the PRA and the Administrative Procedure Act, 44
U.S.C.A. § 3501 (West Supp. 1982), 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
44 U.S.C.A. § 3507 (West Supp. 1982); see 47 Fed. Reg. 39,515 (1982) (to be codified at 5
C.F.R. § 1320.11).
These privacy interests will be an appropriate part of the OMB calculation of approvability
for a new form. 44 U.S.C.A. § 3504; see, e.g., Noble, Budget Office Accepts Tightened Bank
Rules, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1982, at 27; Update on 0MB approvals,Denials ofAgency Requestsfor Data-Gathering,I INSIDE OMB NEWSLETTER, July 2, 1982, at 17.
An exceptional case study of the divergent views is the battle between OMB and Treasury
over IRS forms. IRS wanted to maintain the status quo ante; OMB needed to impact on IRS
in order to achieve its goal of 15% reduction in paperwork demands. The legal issue was the
status of pre-existing regulations under 44 U.S.C.A. §§ 3504, 3507 (West Supp. 1982). Justice's Office of Legal Counsel sided with IRS against OMB. See Office of Legal Counsel
opinion to C. Boyden Gray, June 22, 1982, summarized in Moore, DoJ Restricts OM.B'S
PaperReview Power, Legal Times of Washington, June 28, 1982, at I; Treasury'sNext Move
on Paperwork Ask Justice to Overhaul OMB Policy Draft, 1 INSIDE OMB NEWSLETTER,
July 2, 1982, at 1. Copies of the Treasury correspondence and OMB's responses, which make
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Policies which accomodate the expectations and yet allow for movement in the odd corners of the system are most desirable.
What Agency Should Fill the Central Role?
If there is to be a central agency, there are several candidates, including the DOJ, the Administrative Conference, the GAO, the OMB,
or a newly created agency. The agency selected should be able to handle the policy drafting functions adequately, with little additional
financial support.2 5 0 Second, the agency should have experience in
program supervision because the information disclosure issue is part of
an overall program. Third, it should have the credibility to win defer-

ence from the courts for its central policy role2 51 because the principal
cost savings may be in a unified policy to which courts would defer in

the instance of a disputed disclosure or refusal of disclosure. 2 Finally,
the agency (other than a wholly new creation) must have a desire to

start on the project without additional statutory authority, for Congress
has been slow to act on FOIA reforms.2 5 3 It is appropriate to weigh

each agency's qualifications in turn.
The Department of Justice. The DOJ has more legal staff and more
money available than any of the other agencies, but the Department's

litigation defense orientation and its policy statements may skew its
policy development toward what is most readily defensible under case
law at the time the policy is set.2 54 The DOJ, apart from its incidental
coverage of immigration and the like,2 55 rarely publishes policies. Oc-

casional policy statements on mergers or antitrust policies have been
fascinating historical reading in this first PRA controversy, are available to the public from
the Office of Legal Counsel at Justice or from congressional committees.

250. No funds have been available for the specific function of creating a privacy policy; costs of
251.

252.
253.
254.

255.

the Privacy Act and FOIA have come out of each agency's general overhead in the past, and
a policy creation function would likewise not be usually separated out for budget allocation.
"Deference" in this context is the willingness of a court to construe the very ambiguous
FOIA in a manner which accords great weight to the views of a certain agency. The court
defers when it chooses to do so, to the agency which has a statutory role of interpreting the
ambiguous statute. This PRA power of OMB is the power which had been lacking for the
Justice Department and denied deference in Consumers Union v. Veterans Administration,
301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appealdismissedas moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971).
The arbitrariness of the agency decision is an important factor in submitter suits. Central
policies which themselves are rationally based can illuminate for the reviewing court the
wisdom of the agency's action.
S. 1730, which passed through subcommittee and full committee before being interred by a
political disagreement, came closer than any post-1974 bill to being adopted. S. 1730, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
In the number of lawyers with FOIA familiarity, Justice's Civil Division exceeds all other
agencies. But the policy creating would be done by the Office of Legal Policy, which was
subject to some criticism for its handling of the Freedom of Information Act reform legislation in 1981-82. The Office of Legal Policy, the Civil Division, the Tax Division, and the
Office of Legal Counsel (and perhaps more) would all have to concur before an institutional
Justice Department position could move ahead. The inability of the behemoth to turn toward the FOIA issues and to take an institutional position appears to have been a primary
reason why time expired in the 97th Congress without a compromise passage of FOIA
reforms.
See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. pt. 214 (1982), policy on nonimmigrant classes.
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issued by the Department's Antitrust Division, but policy setting in the
normal publication sense is rare.2 56 The DOJ has been denied a defer257
ential acceptance of its policy guidance on the FOIA by the courts.
Its work on the original Act and subsequent interpretations was
roundly criticized and frequently debated in the courts.25 8 The credibility of a federal disclosure policy could lack persuasiveness if it were
presented to the court as the litigator's version of the client's desires.
Viewed from the perspective of current DOJ employees, the Department is not political. 5 9 There would be critics outside, however, who
would observe that its 1977 and 1981 policy letters on the FOIA are the
most obvious
indicators of the political control of information
2 60

policy.

The Administrative Conference. The Administrative Conference is
tiny and is growing smaller with the 1982 budget reductions. The Conference has a politically appointed head, a very small staff and budget,
and a large membership dominated as a matter of statute by administrative agency counsel and "alumni" in private practice.26 1 The Conference operates by consensus and adopts recommendations reflecting
both scholarship and political support.2 62 The Conference receives
heavy input from federal agency members, many of whom have long-

time administrative law experience within the agencies. It is overtly
very political, with recorded votes on a semi-annual basis.263 Conference consensus voting brings a detachment from direct political involvement, but a nontraditional substructure within the Conference's
256. The selection of cases by the Solicitor General, and his veto power over appeals, is a very
important policy-killing power. Policy setting is more extraordinary and the issuance of a
merger policy or the like will be an exception rather than a norm for the Department as a
whole.
257. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Administration, 301 F. Supp. 796
(S.D.N.Y. 1969). FOI plaintiffs counsel have not been able to convince courts to give "backwards deference" either. Where Justice disagreed with the agency and plaintiffs learned that
Justice did not support the agency's legal position, plaintiffinvoked Justice as a putative ally.
The court refused to consider that claim. Nemetz v. Dept. of Treasury, 446 F. Supp. 102
(N.D. IMI.1978).
258. See Jordan v. Dept. of Justice, 591 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1978); 1973 FOIHearings,supra note
50, vol. 2, at 122 (testimony of Kass). Kass had been counsel to the responsible subcommittee who later asserted that Justice had threatened a 1966 veto in order to obtain modificatioas of the Act's legislative history on the House side.
259. Interviews with Justice Dept. attorneys, June and July 1982.
260. Letters to heads of all federal agencies from Atty. Gen. Bell (May 5, 1977) and Atty. Gen.
Smith (May 4, 1981), reprintedin 1981 FOI Hearings supra note 61, at 912-13.
261. 5 U.S.C. § 575 (1976).
262. See, e.g., ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNrrED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND

REPoRTS 1980 (S. Boley, ed. 1981).
263. For example, the FOIA commercial data recommendation was tabled and referred to three
committees in December 1981, then debated for almost three hours in June 1982, with about
a dozen amendments, each of which were either accepted by the ACUS committee or defeated when pressed by an opponent of a portion of the recommendation. ACUS is prestigious because it puts its reports through the scholarly gauntlet and then exposes them to up-ordown votes in a politically mixed forum. 5 U.S.C. § 575 describes the assembly of the Conference, which passes upon each recommendation. See 47 Fed. Reg. 30,701 (1982) (to be
codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-1).
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permanent staffl 64 (and perhaps no member voting opportunity)2 65
would be required to complete and update an information disclosure
policy for all agencies. Much more funding would also be required to
develop a central
FOIA policy than the hard-pressed staff has available
266
for the task.

Congress considered giving FOIA oversight to the Administrative
Conference in 1979. The Conference was mildly interested, but only if
funds were available.267 But Congress provided neither the authority
nor the funds. The Conference is even less of a contender to assume
FOIA leadership in 1982 than it was in 1979. At this time, the Conference could not take on the FOIA policy responsibility without some
express legislative decision on substance and more funding.268
The GeneralAccountingOffice. GAO also could handle the assignment.2 69 It studies the FOIA from time to time and often makes useful
policy suggestions. 2 0 But GAO in 1980 desired that OMB take over
the information disclosure policy.271 It is unlikely that GAO would
wish to take it on. If it did so desire, Congress would need to specifically authorize that extensive involvement of the congressional auditors
at GAO into day to day executive branch management.272
The Office of Management and Budget. The paperwork reduction
functions of the Director of the Office of Management & Budget are
actually one directive, divided into six parts. Information "policies,
principles, standards and guidelines" are the directives explicitly under
264. The permanent staff, about a dozen, supports committees and outside scholars, but does not
itself draft official government-wide policies without definite statutory direction that it must
do so (and funding to support that diversion).
265. An information policy might not need to go through the Assembly if the policy tracks identically Recommendation 82-1; but the imposition upon other agencies would probably be such
a change that it would need a separate vote, results of which are doubtful either way.
266. Cuts in budget have more severely affected the small ACUS staff than they have at other
agencies.
267. Hearingson Regulation Reform Act of 1979 Before the House Comm on the Judiciary 1016
(1979) (testimony of R. Berg). The reaction appears to have been lukewarm and conditional
upon funds.
268. The author served as ACUS consultant on recommendation 82-1, research for which was the
genesis of this article. The subjective prediction that the Conference could not take on the
policy role without funding remains to be tested if ACUS were willing to take on the government-wide role with its current funding. 47 Fed. Reg. 30,701 (1982) (to be codified at 1
C.F.R. § 305.82-1).
269. The Government Accounting Office is a congressional support agency and not part of the
executive branch. It is not an "agency" under 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(e), 552a(a)(1), or 44 U.S.C.A.
§ 3502(1).
270. See, e.g., GAO REPORT No. LCD-80-8, supra note 175, and GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPACT OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY ACT ON LAW ENFORCE-

MENT AGENCIES (1978) (No. GGD-78-108).
271. PaperworkReduction Act of 1980: Hearings on H.A 6410 Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm on Govt. Operations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1980) (testimony of Comp. Gen. E.
Staats).
272. Congress defines GAO's jurisdiction and has never indicated a desire for GAO to take over
that function.
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OMB's control.27 3 The six functions are general information policy, 2 74

collection request clearance (including paperwork control) 27 5 statistical
policy, 2 76 records management, 277 automatic data processing,278 and
privacy.2 79 Of these, the "information disclosure and confidentiality"

powers, under the privacy function,280 are most relevant to a discussion

of the FOIA.2 81 OMB will develop and implement policy applicable to

with the Privacy Act
all agencies, will continue to monitor compliance
"and related information management law' '282 -unfortunately undefined in the PRA-and will provide guidance to agencies about information disclosure.2 8
The OMBs other new functions are too numerous to mention; indeed, a full execution of the PRA duties would require an agency as
large as a full Department rather than the relatively tiny OMB.2 84
OMB would need a huge budget and manpower allocation to execute
all of its possible statutory functions under the PRA. 285 The priority
project became the clearance of agency forms, because that carried a

statutory deadline.286 Other missions will be taken up as priorities call

for attention.2 87 Preliminary thinking has been given to the privacy
role, 288 and at least a tentative step was taken,2 89 but nothing concrete
had occurred by the fall of 1982. Given the budget problems with
44 U.S.C.A. § 3504(a) (West Supp. 1982).
Id at § 3504(b).
Id at § 3504(c).
Id at § 3504(d).
Id at § 3504(e).
Id at § 3504(g), and this includes telecommunications activities policy.
Id at § 3504(f).
Id: "The privacy functions of the Director shall include--(l) developing and implementing
policies, principles, standards and guidelines on information disclosure and confidentiality,
and on safeguarding the security of information collected or maintained by or on behalf of
the agencies; (2) providing agencies with advice and guidance about information security,
restriction, exchange and disclosure; and (3) monitoring compliance with section 552a of title
5, United States Code and related information management laws."
281. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
282. 44 U.S.C.A. § 3504() (West Supp. 1982). Note that before April 1, 1983, OMB must "submit
to the President and the Congress legislative proposals to remove inconsistencies in laws and
ractices involving privacy, confidentiality, and disclosure of information." 44 U.S.C.A.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

3505(3)(F). It can be presumed that the "laws ...

283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

involving ...

disclosure of informa-

tion" to be amended will include the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
The information disclosure function is defined in the privacy functions role, at 44 U.S.C.A.
§ 3504(f) (West Supp. 1982).
Interviews with several officials found them appreciative of the OMB's potential authority
but doubtful that the management side of OMB could expand to meet the needs of the PRA,
since the budget side was cutting so many other agencies.
The measures required to fully execute 44 U.S.C.A. § 3504 and to prepare the legislative
plans called for in 44 U.S.C.A. § 3505 would be heroic, and are far beyond the reach of the
small current staff of OMB.
No agency form could be required to be submitted, under any penalty, if the form was issued
requesting the information after Dec. 31, 1981, and if the agency had failed to receive OMB
approval.
OMB Interviews with Bedell, supra note 155, and Michael J. Horowitz (June 1982).
Because the PRA rules themselves were "enormously complex," Interview with Horowitz,
id, the privacy functions will be looked at "in the future." Those PRS rules were issued in
proposed form in September 1982. 47 Fed. Reg. 39,515 (1982).
OMB asked Justice to send the deputy director of the Justice FOIA office on a temporary
detail assignment, to organize the privacy functions of OMB, shortly after adoption of the
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which government managers are faced, even the arrival of the new

powers in the PRA does not guarantee that resources will be spent to
wisely solve information policy problems.
OMB's weaknesses are political and resource ones. OMB often
serves as a lightning rod for Presidential program.2 9 0 The OMB develops ideas and takes the lead in sponsoring Administration policy on

controversial issues. Regardless of the mastery by OMB's leadership
cadre of the role of central policy creation, they still must endure suspicion as the messenger carrying to agencies the news of the policy deci2 91

sions made by White House staff and other Presidential appointees.

Being a lightning rod atop the executive branch affords the OMB an

unparalleled policy view. Of the candidates for an information disclosure policy agency, OMB has the best experience for creation of a policy overview and the best ability to manage a cross-agency project
without collapse of the effort.2 92 The ready statutory power to take on
the assignment under the PRA is a definite advantage. OMB authority

can reach independent agencies as well.293
OMB roles on the budget side also are important to its management
of information policy. Collection of information by the agencies aids
agency programs but costs money. OMB has traditionally supervised
the allocation of funds to agency missions, cutting funds and questioning the benefit of agency projects as necessary.2 94 Publication programs

of an agency are part of overall federal disclosure policy; reducing
funds for the publication of agency information in handbooks, flyers,

etc. has been a theme of the Reagan Administration's OMB.2 95 That

by Ralph Nader as a suppression of
role has been roundly criticized
29 6
helpful information floWS.
The OMB's funding for its own projects is slM, 2 9 7 though it has the

best position for allocation of more funds because it manages the funding of the entire PRA project. Opponents of a central information disclosure policy would attack its funding first, since this is the least visible

290.
291.
292.
293.

294.
295.
296.
297.

PRA in December 1980. The head of that Justice office refused, because he disagreed with
OMB involvement in that area of law. Telephone interview with Saloschin, supra note 113.
L. BFRMAN, supra note 9, at 125; see also L. LYNN, supra note 9.
L. BERMAN, supra note 9, at 125.
Id For a perspective on project management, see L. LYNN, supra note 9, and F. MALEK,
supra note 9.
An "independent regulatory agency" can be affected by the OMB powers under the
Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C.A. § 3502(1) (West Supp. 1982). OMB does not have
the same authority over independent agencies under the regulatory reform executive order,
Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 11.
See, e.g., R. RosE, supra note 9.
Reductions in the number of publications as a costs savings measure has been a theme of the
OMB in 1981-82.
R. Nader, Address to Assn. of Government Communicators, reprintedin 1981 FOHearings,
supra note 61, at 343.
Interviews with OMB officials uniformly found that the agency is suffering on the management side from reductions in budget and personnel. See also reorganization of the offices
within OMB under "very tight budget constraints," in Wright Reorganizes OMB to Stress
OMB Role on Policy Formulation,Oversight, I INSIDE OMB NEWSLETrER, June 18, 1982, at
7.
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Capitol Hill counterattack to a substantive program and can be managed with a relative handful of House members agreeing on the small
phrase in a large appropriation bill. 298 Though OMB is most vulnerable to charges of political control,29 9 in historical perspective the nonstatutory DOJ guidance under the FOIA has had every bit as much
political control. 300 The DOJ has been less conscious of openness policy issues than OMB, when the two have worked on the openness question in the regulatory reform legislation.3 ° ' Program supervision and
policy circular direction has been the OMB's strength for decades, and
on this aspect OMB is the strongest of the candidates. Reaching now to
non-executive branch "independent agencies" under the PRA, OMB
circulars can be more effective as a policy statement to all agencies than
the DOJ's missives could be.3 °2
The Commission or Ombudsman Alternatives. Independent creation
of an FOIA Ombudsman or Commission is an old idea, dating back to
Senator Gaylord Nelson's 1963 suggestions.3 03 It has been seriously
considered in the past. A comprehensive suggestion by former DOJ
expert Robert Saloschin was the best proposal offered, 3° but at least
two law review commentators have offered similar ideas.30 5
The two are different operating entities, usually seen as mutually
exclusive proposals. A commission to set and implement policy appears to be more workable than an ombudsman to resolve disputes.
The ombudsman would be an informal adjudicatory official acting as
an appellate authority after a final agency denial. By setting some form
298. This end-run around the difficulty of substantive change to an agency's jurisdiction would be
most difficult to run against OMB, however, since that agency must examine each appropriation change; this tactic works best when used against an agency without much political in-

volvement with appropriation committee staffs.
299. The Nixon Presidency was disastrous for OMB's reputation as a solid, independent source of
management advice. L. BERMAN, supra note 9, at 125, and the Reagan OMB has likewise
been attacked for controversial substantive program proposals, see C. LUDLAM, UNDERMINING PUBLIC PROTECTIONS: THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION REGULATORY PROGRAM (1981);
0WB Proposes DroppingFTC,4ntitrust 4ctivity, NAT'L. J., Feb. 21, 1981, at 327. Political
control charges come with the territory and do not worry those OMB officials responsible for
PRA policy. See Profie-OMB's Jim Joseph Tozzi, ENVTL. F., May, 1982, at 11.

300. Letter of Att'y Gen. Bell and Letter of Att'y Gen. Smith, supra note 260. The Department's
directives on disclosure policy have reflected the entering administration's political alliances
rather than any concern about case law developments.
301. OMB has been more willing to accept public involvement, accepting the Kennedy amendment, discussed supra notes 146-59 and accompanying text, filing its comments on new rules
under Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 11, in a public file, and rarely invoking FOIA
exemptions except in unusual cases. National Tank Truck Carriers Inc. v. OMB, 1982 Fed.
Carr. Cas. (CCH) 83,004 (D. D.C. 1982). Justice has vigorously opposed the ex parte
recording or logging of contacts, in response to suggestions for such programs by Sen. Kennedy and others, S. 1291, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
302. For a listing of OMB Circulars, see 5 C.F.R. pt. 1310 (1982). OMB Circulars are the usual
standard for agency financial operations, and would be expected to have more of a following
in the agencies than occasional Justice missives.
303. 1963 F01 Hearings,supra note 34.

304. Robert Saloschin, Address to Federal Bar Assn., 8th Annual Conference on Openness in
Government, Mar. 16, 1982.
305. Miller & Cox, supra note 178, and Koch & Rubin, supra note 178.
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of a policy precedent with each adjudication, other agencies might
learn from the ombudsman. But a policy creation role comes easier to
a commission, which would set the policy, monitor its adoption by
agencies, and assist in its implementation as an adviser to the agencies. 3 01 A commission delivers more predictable outcomes faster,
touches more agencies more consistently, and balances out the temptation to be a "captured" advocate. "Capture" is usually used in the industrial regulatory sense,3 °7 but in the context of an ombudsman it is
agency out
inevitable that a disclosure advocacy role will pull the new 38
of the balance which a policy establishment role demands.
Students of the ombudsman concept would do well to watch the
new official in Canada, the Information Commissioner. 30 9 The new
Access Law in Canada creates an administrative appeal, not to the
agency but to an administrative officer with investigative and adjudicative powers.310 The Information Commissioner's vast geographical and
administrative agency jurisdiction in Canada will demand a large staff
and travel budget. At present, it does not seem likely to have the necessary funding. If it does and if the work is generally accepted, then the
commission or the ombudsman proposals may be seriously studied
here.3 1
It is significant that Canada's procedures and substance are better
crafted than any United States counterpart. Canada tried to learn from
the United States experience, adopting instead a better commercial
data standard than the United States court-created "substantial competitive harm" standards.31 2 It protects trade secrets per se, information of a private commercial nature "treated consistently in a
confidential manner" by the submitter, contract negotiation information, and information which "could reasonably be expected to
prejudice the competitive position" of the submitter.31 3 The effort in
the United States to adopt an equivalent to the Canadian method failed
306. This would have been the role of the Privacy Protection Study Commission had it been made
permanent, but it lapsed in 1977. Pub. L. No. 93-579 § 5, 88 Stat. 1909 (1974).
307. The theory of capture asserts that the agency regulating in a particular field becomes an
advocate of the constituents with whom it deals rather than the other interests which it

should factor into its overall activities. Though the "capture" theory is not always followed,
S. BREYER, supra note 242, at 10, the phenomenon would inevitably occur with a special

agency advocating requesters against the government.
308. The advocacy of the requester inherent in an ombudsman approach will inevitably sway the

perspective of the office away from competing interests such as the rationales for exempt
information's nondisclosure.

309. Access to Information Act, § 54, Bill C-43, 32d Parliament, 1st Sess. (1982). The Act and its
companion Privacy Act were passed by the House of Commons on June 28, 1982 and will be
codified after Proclamation of the bill in 1982-83.
310. Id §§ 35-36.
311. The Canadian Manufacturers Association and other trade groups which worked on the bill
did not oppose the Information Commissioner. However, more funds will be needed and

since provincial-federal disputes may be expected, the task of the Commissioner will be a
difficult one.
312. Access to Information Act, supra note 309, § 18. O'Reilly, CanadarAccess Legflation,
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION CENTER REPORT No. 438 (1981).
313. Access to Information Act, supra note 309, § 18.
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in May 1982.Y1 4 And until Congress chooses to legislate, there will be
neither a clear policy nor an ombudsman to enforce it. Until more
experience with Canada's system is available, the commission or
ombudsman system is not ripe for use in the United States.
Likely Opponents of a Policy Drafting Agency
With so many suitors, the information policy role would seem to be
a prize. But the creation of a policy attracts opponents. During the
1982 legislative process for reform of the FOIA, opponents of changes
drew in the heavyweight press lobbying effort to stall any amendmerits.31 5 The same attacks could occur with a policy drafting agency.
An agency which initiates an information disclosure policy would
expect media opposition. The media has paid little attention to the
PRA, and has been unwilling to accept change to the FOIA.31 6 The
dangers of diversity in agency disclosure discretion are dangers for any
operating organization, including the press. Profit data filed in Newspaper Preservation Act3 17 proceedings, new printing machinery described in Occupational Safety and Health Act reports, faster drying
inks listed in chemical ingedient detail by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, 3 18 and telecommunications expansion
plans of broadcasters 31 9 are as much at risk of agency discretionary
release as any other private person's sensitive information.
Talismanic defenses of the "right to know" often fall short of analysis of the operational problems of the FOIA itself. The ideal is short of
the administrative reality. Lofty defenses have a fine tone but a myopic
unreality in the context of haphazard federal discretion to release documents of individuals, unions, firms, and organizations about their private activities. All agree that the FOIA has not been administratively
smooth in terms of operating difficulties at the headquarters and regional levels.3 2 °
Another problem for the policy creator is that courts have become
314. The substantive change was dropped in the May 1982 Senate Judiciary Committee passage
of S. 1730.

315. The American Civil Liberties Union and Ralph Nader's numerous groups were the principal
opponents of the reform legislation, S. 1730. Assistance from the newspaper trade associations aided the opposition to reverse the bill which had passed the Subcommittee on the
Constitution of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in December 1981.
316. Testimony of press groups was uniformly against amendment of the FOIA, in 1981 FO
Hearings,supra note 61.

317. Pub. L. No. 91-353, 84 Stat. 466 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1801 (1976)).
318. NIOSH studies plant conditions for airborne mission exposure levels under the National
Occupational Hazards Survey, 42 C.F.R. pts. 85 and 85a (1981). Ink emitted from newspaper printing plants during cleanout operations is a toxic pollutant, 40 C.F.R. pt. 403 App. C.
So the competitor of the newspaper would be able to learn of its innovations from the federal
data.
319. 47 C.F.R. § 21.17 (1981) would require filing of sensitive financial data for the news owner's
broadcast affiliate.
320. The difficulties have ranged from ignorance to disagreement with the Act; the training functions of the Office of Personnel Management lessened the former but cannot change the
latter.
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accustomed to the free rein which Congress gave to the courts under
the FOIA. Reining in agency discretion does not guarantee that the
courts' adventuresome redefining of ambiguous statutory terms will
stop.321 A central policy would be very constructive and would go a
long way to structuring the informational interactions of government,
submitters, and requesters, but courts are unpredictable. What is certain is that a government body entrusted with the administration of the
information policy is certain to face many of the same obstacles faced
by the various agencies now responsible for FOIA implementation.
CONCLUSION

An information disclosure policy of the federal government simply
does not exist. The current diversity of federal agencies' policies regarding the handling of private information grew without statutory
rhyme or reason. The lack of direction contributes to a suspicion which
renders the collection and use of private sector information more difficult for all federal agencies. The suspicion could be significantly alleviated by a uniform federal policy on disclosure standards.
Much of the current federal information policy is a transient response to a permanent, non-transient tension. Efficient administration
requires decisions to be made on adequate documentation. Business
owners regard multiple forms for multiple tax and regulatory programs
as a deterrent from productive work and as an intrusion on business
privacy.322 Individuals affected by federal benefits often resist the ways
in which government screens its potential recipients. The tension between collectors and sources endures; the responses vary.
A federal disclosure policy would address the circumstances under
which agencies would or would not maintain confidential private information as confidential. Agencies would make personal information security and disclosure decisions under the uniform policy, except where
the Privacy Act mandate eliminated discretion. Organizational privacy
information not covered by the Privacy Act would be subject to uniform discretion standards, except where the FOIA or another statute
dictated a specific disclosure or nondisclosure.
The Paperwork Reduction Act is a remarkable tool for development of a consistent federal policy on information because it combines
in one place the functions of input of information to the agency,
processing within the agency, and disclosure by the agency. 3 Principal aspects of the PRA are the review of federal requests for informa321. Pub. L. No. 91-353, 84 Stat. 466 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-04 (1976)). No admin-

istrative policy change can alter the Article III constitutional power of federal courts to independently construe the FOIA during resolution of specific controversies under the FOIA.
322. This was uniformly the opinion expressed by the small business community in particular.

1979 Paperwork Burden Hearings,supra note 130.
323. And this is the PRA's carefully constructed intention, agreed to by both Houses, see S. REPT.
No. 930, supra note 189, H.R. REr. No. 835, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), and stated in the

PRA, 44 U.S.C.A. § 3501 (West Supp. 1982).
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tion,324 screening of these request forms to lessen their burdens
whenever possible,32 5 facilitation of inter-agency exchanges of information,326 and guidance by OMB in information gathering, storage, and
disclosure.3 27
Of the agencies which are available, the Office of Management &
Budget is most likely to do a comprehensive, prompt, and fair job on
such a policy. OMB alone has current statutory power under its
Paperwork Reduction Act "privacy functions" to control governmentwide disclosure policy. That PRA power should be implemented
promptly by the top management of the Office of Management &
Budget, using current resources and enlisting an inter-agency group of
contributors where needed to formulate the best possible central policy.

324.
325.
326.
327.

44
Id
Id
Id

U.S.C.A. § 3504(c)(1) (West Supp. 1982).
and § 3504(c)(2).
at § 3511.
at § 3504(b).

